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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Has Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc. ("FLT") failed to establish
standing to bring a citizens' suit under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), for failing
to set forth facts establishing injury in fact, redressability and an
injury that is within the "zone of interests" protected by the
RCRA?
Does the State of New Union ("New Union") lack standing to
bring a citizens' suit under § 6972(a)(1)(B) for failing to set forth
* This brief has been reprinted in its original form. No revisions, other than
technical minor revisions, have been made by the editorial staff of the Pace Environ-
mental Law Review.
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facts establishing standing as parens patriae and similarly failing
to establish redressability and an injury within the zone of inter-
ests of the RCRA?
Are FLT and New Union barred from bringing this RCRA citi-
zens' suit by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
because of the earlier case, Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista Corp., or
by § 6972(b) since they failed to serve copies of their complaints to
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") and the U.S. Attorney General?
Are Buena Vista's airborne emissions of particulate mercury
"solid waste" for purposes of § 6972(a)(1)(B) even though the
Clean Air Act ("CAA") pervasively regulates air pollution, and the
RCRA explicitly excludes "uncontained gaseous matter" from the
meaning of "solid waste"?
Are FLT and New Union barred from bringing this RCRA citi-
zens' suit because of the CAA's pervasive regulation of air pollu-
tion, as well as Blue Skies and Federal law that restricts the
venue and timeliness for judicial review of a permit?
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OPINION BELOW
The unpublished opinion of the United States District Court
for the District of New Union appears in Appendix A.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The statutes relevant to the determination of this case are the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992(k) (1994); the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671(q) (1994); and the Clean Skies Act ("CSA"), B.S.R.C.
15: § 1900 et seq. Relevant sections are reprinted in Appendix C.
Regulations relevant to this case are 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.6, 61.50-.55,
and 60.40-40a. Relevant sections are also reprinted in Appendix
C.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Buena Vista Power Co. ("Buena Vista") operates two coal-
fired power plants in the State of Blue Skies ("Blue Skies"). (R. at
A-1.) When these plants burn coal, their stacks emit gaseous pol-
lutants containing minute particles of mercury. (R. at A-1.) Most
of the mercury particles are captured in air pollution control
equipment, but a small fraction of the particles escape into the
atmosphere. (R. at A-1.)
Pursuant to sub-chapter V of the CAA, Blue Skies has
promulgated a permit program, the CSA, that was approved by
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). (R. at A-2.) The
Blue Skies Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC"),
Blue Skies' approved permitting authority, issued a permit for
each of Buena Vista's power plants. (R. at A-5.)
Buena Vista's permits are over fifty pages long, containing
numerous requirements. (R. at B-3.) Sulfur oxide emissions limi-
tations result in a large reduction of Buena Vista's mercury emis-
sions. (R. at A-5.) Buena Vista's permits also require weekly
monitoring of each plant's mercury emissions from the stacks, as
well as fifty down wind ground stations throughout Blue Skies.
(R. at A-5) . In addition, the permit includes a specific provision
that Buena Vista will incorporate a mercury emissions limitation
for coal-fired power plants as soon as the EPA promulgates one.
(R. at A-6.) Buena Vista is in full compliance with all limitations
within its permits. (R. at B-2.)
Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc. ("FLT") is a non-profit corporation
organized for the protection of Lake Tokay in the State of New
Union ("New Union"). (R. at A-1.) FLT has brought a citizens'
suit action, under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(b), seeking an in-
junction requiring Buena Vista to cease all mercury emissions
from its two power plants. (R. at A-1.) New Union filed a motion
to intervene pursuant to section 6972(b)(2)(e) and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24, which was granted by the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Union ("District Court"). (R. at A-1.)
FLT and New Union ("Appellants") allege that mercury parti-
cles emitted from Buena Vista's power plants travel through the
atmosphere to airspace over New Union, and contaminate Lake
Tokay. (R. at A-1.) The EPA has conducted a study indicating
that most of the mercury in Lake Tokay comes from Buena Vista's
power plants. (R. at A-2.) The New Union Department of Public
Health ("NUDPH") issued a health advisory, giving notice that
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fish living in Lake Tokay contain levels of mercury that, if eaten
on a weekly basis, could be unhealthy. (R. at A-1.) Buena Vista
denies the validity of both the EPA's study and the accuracy of the
health advisory. (R. at A-2.)
Two members of FLT submitted affidavits averring that they
have fished recreationally in Lake Tokay for over two decades. (R.
at A-4.) Both affiants allege that after the health advisory was
issued they discontinued eating fish from the Lake or giving fish
to their friends. (R. at A-4.) However, they still recreationally fish
in the Lake at apparently the same frequency.
The parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment.
(R. at A-1.) The District Court granted Buena Vista's motion for
partial summary judgment against both Appellants, holding that
their citizens' suit was implicitly barred by the CAA section 7404.
(R. at A-7.) Both Appellants appeal that decision. Additionally,
FLT appeals the District Court's finding that it lacked standing.
(R. at A-4.) Buena Vista cross appeals the District Court's denial
of its motions for summary judgment based on New Union's lack
of standing and the fact that Buena Vista's mercury emissions are
not "solid waste" for purposes of RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B). (R.
at A-3.) Finally, Buena Vista appeals the District Court's decision
not to address the issue of whether FLT and New Union's claims
are barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel in
light of the earlier decision, Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista Corp.,
No. Civ. 98-27, slip. op. (Coughlin Co. Sup. Ct., Jan. 5 1999), or
whether they are barred for not complying with RCRA section
6972(b)(2)(F). (R. at A-7.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court must review de novo a district court's grant of
summary judgment. See K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d
1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court properly ruled that FLT lacks standing.
This Court should affirm the District Court based on FLT's failure
to set forth facts establishing that it has suffered an injury in fact,
that such injury would be redressable by RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B), and that this injury is within the "zone of interests"
protected by section 6972(a)(1)(B).
20001
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The District Court erred, however, in holding that New Union
has standing. New Union has not alleged facts establishing injury
to a quasi-sovereign interest sufficient to have standing as parens
patriae. Moreover, New Union, just as FLT, fails to establish that
its alleged injury is redressable and within the "zone of interests"
protected by section 6972(a)(1)(B).
Even if this Court finds that either FLT or New Union has
standing, the District Court should have determined that the deci-
sion in Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista Power Co., No. Civ. 98-27,
slip. op. (Coughlin Co. Sup. Ct., Jan. 5 1999), renders the Appel-
lants' claim res judicata. Furthermore, the Appellants' are collat-
erally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether enjoining
Buena Vista is appropriate. The court in Bluepeace, Inc. held
that injunctive relief was inappropriate, and since the Appellants
are required to show that injunctive relief is appropriate to obtain
relief under section 6972(a)(1)(B), the court should grant Buena
Vista's motion for summary judgment.
This Court should also grant Buena Vista's motion for sum-
mary judgment against the Appellants based on their failure to
comply with the citizens' suit service requirements under section
6972(b)(2)(F).
In addition, the District Court erred when it held that Buena
Vista's airborne mercury emissions are "solid waste" for purposes
of § 6972(a)(1)(B). These emissions are essentially uncontained
gaseous matter and therefore are excluded from being "solid
waste."
Finally, this Court should affirm the District Court's holding
that the Appellants' claims are barred by the CAA, and CSA.
RCRA is inapplicable because the CAA pervasively regulates air
pollution. Furthermore, since the Appellants are essentially chal-
lenging the terms of Buena Vista's CSA permits, they are barred
by federal and state law for violating judicial review time and
venue restrictions.
ARGUMENT
I. FRIENDS OF LAKE TOKAY HAS NOT ESTABLISHED
STANDING BECAUSE IT HAS FAILED TO
SATISFY BOTH CONSTITUTIONAL AND
PRUDENTIAL LIMITATIONS.
Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution limits
the federal courts' jurisdiction to actual "Cases" and "Controver-
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(1998). The Steel Co. court restated the "'inflexible and without
exception'" requirement that standing "be established as a thresh-
old matter. . . ." 188 S. Ct. at 1012 (quoting Mansfield, C. &
L.M.R.Y. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)) (emphasis added)
(reasoning further that addressing the merits of a case before
standing, even where the prevailing party would be the same as
the prevailing party were standing denied, "carries the courts be-
yond the bounds of authorized judicial action"). Therefore, this
Court must first examine whether FLT has standing to bring this
RCRA citizens' suit.
As an environmental group, FLT "may have standing to sue
in federal courts based either on an injury to the organization in
its own right, or as the representative of its members who have
been harmed." NRDC v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir.
1992). A generous interpretation of FLT's position offers, at best,
an allegation of general injury to its interest in protecting Lake
Tokay. Such an allegation does not amount to a showing of injury
to the organization in its own right. See Common Cause v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 108 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[W]here an
organization is suing on its own behalf, it must establish concrete
and demonstrable injury to the organization's activities - with a
consequent drain on the organization's resources - constituting
more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social
interests."). FLT has introduced affidavits of two of its members
and therefore attempts to assert representational standing. See
Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1984).
To have representational standing, FLT must set forth facts
showing that it has members who would individually have stand-
ing to sue. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). An individual must meet three require-
ments to satisfy the constitutional limitations on standing. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). First, the
individual must allege "an injury in fact - an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. (internal
quotations omitted). Second, "the injury has to be fairly traceable
to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court." Id.
(internal quotations omitted). Third, "it must be likely, as op-
posed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision." Id. (internal quotations omitted). In addition
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to these constitutional limitations, the plaintiff must satisfy judi-
cially-imposed prudential limitations. See Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (stating that standing "involves both consti-
tutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential
limitations on its exercise"). Specifically, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that its claim falls within the "zone of interests" pro-
tected by the law invoked. See Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
At the summary judgment phase, FLT bears the burden of
alleging specific facts that establish its standing. See Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561. This Court must affirm the District Court's order of
summary judgment against FLT since FLT has failed to set forth
facts satisfying both constitutional and prudential standing limi-
tations. Moreover, this Court's determination that FLT lacks
standing precludes the Court from proceeding to the merits of
their case. See Exparte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868) ("With-
out jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.").
A. FLT Has Not Alleged Facts Showing An Injury In Fact.
The affidavits of FLT members, Steven Jones and Artimus
Winfred, fail to show "an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 'actual or immi-
nent, not conjectural or hypothetical."' Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). The
affiants state that they live near, but not on Lake Tokay, and use
the Lake only for sports fishing. (R. at A-4.) Both members kept
some of the fish they caught to eat or give friends to eat and re-
turned others to the Lake. (R. at A-4.) The NUDPH issued a
health advisory banning the sale of fish from the Lake and advis-
ing the public against consuming fish from the Lake. (R. at A-1.)
The advisory warned that the fish contained levels of mercury
that, if eaten on a weekly basis, could cause mercury poisoning in
humans. (R. at A-2.) After release of the advisory both affiants
discontinued eating any fish from the Lake, or giving any to their
friends. (R. at A-4.)
The only cognizable injury alleged by the members is their
fear of eating or having their friends eat the fish they catch. This
injury cannot be characterized "concrete and particularized" with-
out an indication of, at minimum, approximately the number of
fish this injury prevents these affiants from eating or giving to
friends to eat. Moreover, they cannot base their fear on the
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NUDPH warning without an allegation of the approximate num-
ber of fish the affiants do not eat or choose not to give to their
friends to eat, as well as how often both members fish at Lake
Tokay. The warning states that the fish pose a health risk only if
eaten on a weekly basis. (R. at A-2.) Therefore, the members' fear
is unsubstantiated if they did not eat fish on a weekly basis or did
not fish frequently enough to support eating fish from the Lake on
a weekly basis. See, e.g., Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lum-
ber Co., No. C-97-0292 MHP, 1999 WL 668583, *16 (N.D. Cal.,
Aug. 19, 1999) (holding that the environmental organization mem-
bers' "spatial and temporal contacts with [the affected waterway]
are too sporadic or attenuated to satisfy the injury in fact prong of
the standing analysis") Id. at 1057.
For an injury in fact to be "particularized," the injury "must
affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560-61 & n.1 (internal quotations omitted). Affiants Jones
and Winfred have not sufficiently plead facts that show they are
affected in a personal and individual way. At the summary judg-
ment stage, FLT "can no longer rest on ... mere allegations, but
must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts." Id. at
561 (reasoning that general factual allegations of injury may suf-
fice at the pleading stage, but not at the summary judgment stage)
(internal quotations omitted). Members of FLT may have suffered
injury in fact under Article III. However, FLT has not set forth
affidavits of any other members demonstrating such an injury,
and the affidavits of Jones and Winfred fall short. FLT's failure to
set forth these specific facts in response to Buena Vista's motion
for summary judgment requires the Court to affirm the District
Court's grant of summary judgment against FLT.
B. FLT's Alleged Injury Is Not Redressable By A Favorable
Judicial Ruling.
The redressability component is satisfied where it is "'likely,'
as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 're-
dressed by a favorable decision."' Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). FLT asks the
Court to enjoin Buena Vista from further emitting mercury from
its two Blue Skies power plants. (R. at A-1.) This injunction will
not redress FLT's alleged injury since it is unlikely that FLT
members would thereafter be able to eat fish from the Lake. In
addition, FLT has not shown that an injunction is warranted here
according to traditional rules of equity.
2000] 567
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1. Enjoining Buena Vista from future mercury emissions is
not likely to make the fish in Lake Tokay safer to eat
and therefore cannot redress FLT members' fear of
eating the fish they catch.
FLT's requested relief cannot redress FLT members' fear of
eating fish from Lake Tokay since it has not been shown that FLT
members would be able to eat the fish they catch following issu-
ance of the injunction. Mercury would still be present in the
Lake's ecosystem, indefinitely affecting the concentration of mer-
cury within the Lake's fish population. Furthermore, mercury cir-
culating in the atmosphere from unidentifiable sources will
continue to contaminate the Lake. The legislative history to the
Clean Air Act specifically remarks on this inherent characteristic
of mercury pollution stating that, "[w]hat little is known of mer-
cury movement in the biosphere, suggests that its long residence
time makes it a long-range transport problem of international or
worldwide dimensions." 1990 CAA Leg. Hist. 731, *779. It is
therefore unlikely that enjoining Buena Vista will redress FLT
members' fear of eating fish from Lake Tokay. See Wademan v.
Concra, 13 F.Supp.2d 295, 305 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that
where plaintiffs were no longer associated with the site containing
solid waste, they "lack[ed] standing because any remedial action
... would not effect or assist the plaintiffs").
2. FLT's injury is not redressable since the RCRA citizens'
suit provision prohibits actions for damages and an
injunction is not warranted here under traditional
rules of equity.
RCRA certainly provides the District Court discretion to
award injunctive relief upon a showing of the disposal of a solid or
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) ("The district court shall
have jurisdiction to restrain any person who has contributed or
who is contributing to ... disposal of any solid waste ... which
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment" and "to order such person to take such
other action as may be necessary, or both. . . ."). However, "[tihe
grant of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly
suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all circum-
stances, and a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechani-
cally obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law."
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Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (citations
omitted).
Just as the Clean Water Act ("CWA") was interpreted in Ro-
mero-Barcelo, RCRA does not limit this Court's exercise of its
traditional equitable discretion. See id. at 320. Although Con-
gress may limit a court's equitable discretion, RCRA should be
construed "in favor of that interpretation which affords a full op-
portunity for equity courts to treat enforcement proceedings ... in
accordance with their traditional practices." Id. at 320 (quoting
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944)). In light of this
principle of statutory construction, the court in Romero-Barcelo
held that the plain language of the CWA, specifically the Act's pro-
vision for not only injunctive relief, but civil fines and criminal
penalties as well, indicated a legislative intent to leave intact the
courts' equitable discretion. RCRA similarly authorizes enforce-
ment by injunctive relief, civil penalties, and criminal penalties.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a), 6928. Therefore, FLT must satisfy tradi-
tional grounds for injunctive relief under RCRA.
The traditional basis for injunctive relief "has always been ir-
reparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies." Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312 (citations omitted). Furthermore, "a
court must balance the competing claims of injury and must con-
sider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the
requested relief." Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S.
531, 542 (1987).
FLT has not shown to a substantial likelihood that its mem-
bers are injured, or face imminent injury. In Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Village of Gambell, the Court reasoned that "[ilf [environmental]
injury is sufficiently likely... the balance of harms will usually
favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment."
480 U.S. at 545 (emphasis added). However, neither affiant eats
or distributes fish from Lake Tokay at this time, nor do they indi-
cate an imminent likelihood that they will eat or distribute fish
from the Lake in the future. Based on the facts set forth by FLT,
it is impossible to conclude a sufficient likelihood of irreparable
injury.
The court in Gambell correctly reasoned that "[environmen-
tal injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by
money damages." However, unlike the general environmental in-
juries comprehended by the Gambell court, FLT's alleged injury
has an adequate remedy at law. In Davies v. National Coop. Ref
Ass'n, the court reasoned that despite evidence that contaminated
2000] 569
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wells posed a health risk to people, the fact that the plaintiffs had
been warned of the danger and could occupy the property by using
an alternative water supply precluded the issuance of an injunc-
tion. 963 F.Supp. 990, 999 (D. Kan. 1997) ("The fact that [the
plaintiffs] must use bottled water instead of groundwater is un-
doubtedly an inconvenience and an economic burden, but it is the
type of injury for which an action at law provides an adequate rem-
edy.") (emphasis added).
An injunction against Buena Vista would require the com-
pany to cease all operations in light of the fact that it has already
invested and is using air pollution control equipment to capture
most of the mercury emissions. Shutting down the plants would
not only be catastrophic for Buena Vista, but also for the region it
services. Consequently, the balance of harms resulting from
granting or denying this injunction heavily favors a denial of in-
junctive relief. See Gambell, 480 U.S. at 545 (holding that the bal-
ance of harms favored defendant oil company where it had already
committed approximately $70 million to oil exploration and injury
to subsistence resources from exploration was not at all probable);
see also Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872-73
(N.Y. 1970) (holding that injunctive relief was not proper since the
legislature is better suited to address the difficult problem of bal-
ancing the amelioration of pollution against the economic impact
of close regulation).
RCRA does not authorize private actions for damages. See,
e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 316 (6th Cir.
1985). Since FLT's alleged injury does not warrant an injunction
under traditional rules of equity, its claim cannot be redressed by
section 6972(a)(1)(B) and consequently must be dismissed for lack
of standing.
C. FLT Has Not Demonstrated That Its Members' Injury Is
Within The "Zone Of Interests" Protected By 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B).
The "zone of interests" test is a prudential limitation that
asks "whether the complainant is arguably within the 'zone of in-
terests' to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question."
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970). Since the test is a prudential limitation, it may be
modified or abrogated by Congress. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 1161.
However, Congress has not shown an intent to modify or abrogate
application of the prudential "zone of interests" test under RCRA
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section 6972(a)(1)(B). Therefore, this Court should affirm the Dis-
trict Court's order of summary judgment against FLT, since FLT
has not demonstrated that its alleged injury of not being able to
eat fish from Lake Tokay is within the "zone of interests" of sec-
tion 6972(a)(1)(B).
1. Congress did not intend to modify or abrogate use of the
"zone of interests" test under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B).
In Bennett, the Court stated that "Congress legislates against
the background of our prudential standing doctrine, which applies
unless it is expressly negated." 520 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). Congress intended to leave untouched all con-
stitutional and prudential standing limitations under RCRA sec-
tion 6972(a)(1)(B). As the legislative history poignantly states,
"[section 6972(a)(1)(B)] does not affect recognized requirements
regarding legal standing to bring a case." H.R. No. 98-198, Part I,
at 53, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612; see Hazardous
Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 921 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (holding that the "zone of interests" test applies in RCRA's
citizen suit context). The Court's finding in Bennett is therefore
distinguishable based on the absence of similar legislative intent
under the citizens' suit provision of the Endangered Species Act.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
2. Only injuries that may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment are within the "zone of
interests" protected by 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
FLT must show that its alleged injury "arguably falls within
the 'zone of interests' to be protected or regulated" by section
6972(a)(1)(B). National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998).
In Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, the Court held that
"[tihe injury of which respondents complain - their failure to ob-
tain relevant information - is injury of a kind that the [Federal
Election Campaign Act] seeks to address." 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
Here, the injury FLT members complain of - their fear of eating
fish caught while recreationally fishing Lake Tokay - is not in-
jury of a kind that section 6972(a)(1)(B) seeks to address. RCRA's
citizen suit provision is quite specific in the types of injuries it
seeks to address - only those that "may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
2000]
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Furthermore, a comparison of RCRA to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CER-
CLA") justifies limiting the "zone of interests" protected by RCRA
to only those injuries that may present imminent and substantial
endangerments. Both CERCLA and RCRA deal with hazardous
wastes. However, to recover under CERCLA, the plaintiff only
has to show the occurrence of a release or a threatened release of a
hazardous substance. See id. § 9607(a). In contrast, section
6972(a)(1)(B) "requires more than a mere showing that solid or
hazardous wastes are present at the Site." Foster v. United States,
922 F.Supp. 642, 661 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing United States v. Con-
servation Chem. Co., 619 F.Supp. 162, 184 (W.D. Mo. 1985)).
Therefore, FLT must allege an injury that "may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment" to be within RCRA's zone of
protected interests. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
3. FLT has not shown that the mercury in Lake Tokay
may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment.
FLT's asserted injury does not indicate the existence of a po-
tential imminent and substantial endangerment, and therefore is
not within the "zone of interests" protected by section
6972(a)(1)(B). The Jones and Winfred affidavits indicate quite the
opposite, that there is no danger of becoming sick from eating fish
because both men have discontinued eating or distributing any
fish from the Lake. See Rose v. Union Oil Co. of California, No. C
97-3808 FMS, 1999 WL 51819, *3 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 1, 1999) (hold-
ing that absence of proof that contamination might migrate to a
regional water supply failed to show an imminent and substantial
endangerment); see also Foster, 922 F.Supp. at 662 (holding that
site owner failed to establish imminent and substantial endanger-
ment where he acknowledged that ground water under site was
not used for drinking or other purposes).
As the District Court reasonably noted below, "[t]he mercury
in the fish may endanger health, but only if the fish are eaten.
These plaintiffs do not eat the fish and therefore are not endan-
gered by the contamination." (R. at A-4); see Price v. United States
Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiffs
failed to allege existence of solid waste that may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment where wastes were located in
soil beneath cement slab of plaintiffs house); Davies, 963 F.Supp.
at 999 (holding that despite evidence contaminated wells posed a
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significant health risk to people, the fact that the plaintiffs had
been warned of the danger and could occupy the property without
serious risk to their health by using an alternative water supply
precluded a finding of a "substantial and imminent endanger-
ment"). FLT's alleged injury is far from being an imminent and
substantial endangerment and thus does not come within the
"zone of interests" protected by RCRA. FLT's failure to satisfy
this prudential standing limitation requires this court to affirm
the District Court's order of summary judgment against FLT.
II. NEW UNION HAS NOT ESTABLISHED STANDING
BECAUSE IT HAS SIMILARLY FAILED TO
SATISFY CONSTITUTIONAL AND
PRUDENTIAL LIMITATIONS.
New Union, just as FLT and any "person" within the meaning
of RCRA section 6972(a)(1)(B), must satisfy constitutional and
prudential limitations on standing in order to bring an action in
federal court. A state fulfills the injury in fact requirement only
where it alleges injury to a proprietary interest, or injury to a
quasi-sovereign interest under the parens patriae doctrine. See
Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. 251, 257-66 (1972). New Union
has not established injury in fact under either basis. Similar to
FLT, even assuming that New Union can establish injury in fact,
it fails to fulfill both redressability and the prudential "zone of in-
terests" test. New Union's failure to satisfy the constitutional lim-
itations of injury in fact and redressability, in addition to the
prudential "zone of interests" test, requires this Court to reverse
the District Court's denial of summary judgment for Buena Vista.
A. New Union Has Not Alleged Standing Based On An Injury
To A Proprietary Interest.
Alleged injuries to the health, safety, or welfare of a state's
people "clearly implicate the parens patriae rather than the pro-
prietary interest of the state." Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d
668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1976). New Union alleges only that mercury
from Buena Vista's power plants have contaminated fish in Lake
Tokay posing a health risk to humans consuming the fish on a
weekly basis. (R. at A-1.) Therefore, for New Union to have
standing it must be as parens patriae. See id. (reasoning where
injuries "involve no harm to the state beyond the individualized
harms to her citizens" that standing "must be on the theory of the
state as representative"); see generally Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 260-66
20001 573
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(reasoning that the state must allege damages to its own "busi-
ness or property" to have proprietary standing under section 4 of
the Clayton Act).
B. New Union Does Not Have Standing As Parens Patriae.
In limited circumstances a state may "sue as parens patriae to
prevent or repair harm to its 'quasi-sovereign' interests." Hawaii,
405 U.S. at 258; Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458
U.S. 592, 601 (1982) ("[T]o have [parens patriae] standing the
State must assert an injury to what has been characterized as a
'quasi-sovereign' interest."). The Court has found state standing
as parens patriae in the public nuisance context. See, e.g., Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (involving air pollu-
tion in Geogia caused by the discharge of noxious gasses from the
defendant's plant in Tennessee); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208
(1901) (involving water pollution in the Mississippi River in Mis-
souri caused by upstream discharges by Illinois). However, the
Court has been clear that the alleged injury must be "sufficiently
concrete to create an actual controversy between the State and the
defendant." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 602; see also
Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 675 ("Injury to a state's economy or health and
welfare of its citizens, if sufficiently severe and generalized, can
give rise to a quasi-sovereign interest in relief as will justify a rep-
resentative action by the state.") (emphasis added).
For New Union to demonstrate a "sufficiently concrete" and
"quasi-sovereign" interest, it must show "(i) that a substantial
number of the state's inhabitants have been injured, and (ii) that
the state's injury is somehow separate and distinct from the injury
to the individual plaintiff." Pennsylvania v. Philadelphia Psychi-
atric Ctr., 356 F.Supp. 500, 505 (E.D. Pa. 1973); see Prince
George's County v. Levi, 79 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Md. 1977).
New Union has not shown that a substantial number of the
state's inhabitants have been injured. There are no allegations of
the number of fish consumed, or potentially consumed, by citizens
of the State. Furthermore, New Union fails to allege the potential
number of citizens affected by mercury in Lake Tokay. Absent
such allegations, New Union cannot properly show that it has suf-
fered injury to a quasi-sovereign interest.
Additionally, New Union has not set forth any facts indicating
that the activity of eating fish recreationally caught from Lake
Tokay is an interest that is separate and distinct from the injuries
suffered by individual members of FLT. The Kleppe court found
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that, "the presence or absence of a more appropriate party or par-
ties capable of bringing the suit" has significant influence over
whether an injury is "sufficiently severe and generalized." 533
F.2d at 675 n.42 ("The arguments in favor of allowing [parens pa-
triael standing become less compelling, as it becomes more feasi-
ble to achieve complete relief through suits by the parties actually
aggrieved."). In Jones ex rel. Louisiana v. Bowles, the court held
that Louisiana lacked a separate and distinct interest in the
strawberry industry to sue as parens patriae. 322 U.S. 707, 707
(1944), discussed in Land O'Lakes Creameries v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Health, 160 F.Supp. 387, 388 (E.D. La. 1958). Similarly, in
Land O'Lakes Creameries v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, the
court found that Minnesota's interest in dried milk was not sepa-
rate and distinct from the interests of individual citizens in the
dried milk industry. Id. (finding that Minnesota's dairy industry
is not the largest industry in Minnesota, and that statistics failed
to show that the dried milk sales are "of such pervasive impor-
tance to [the dairy industry] and to Minnesota citizens generally
that restrictions on the interstate distribution of dried milk would
directly and materially affect the 'welfare of the people of Minne-
sota"'). New Union's failure to set forth estimates of the number
of people not eating fish recreationally caught from Lake Tokay
precludes a finding that the State's interest is separate and dis-
tinct from the interest asserted by FLT. Therefore, New Union
cannot demonstrate that its interest in protecting its citizens' abil-
ity to eat fish recreationally caught from Lake Tokay is of such
pervasive importance to justify standing as parens patriae.
C. Even Assuming New Union Satisfies The Requirements For
Standing As Parens Patriae, It Still Fails To Satisfy
Redressability And The "Zone Of Interests" Test.
Beyond demonstrating injury to a quasi-sovereign interest,
New Union, like FLT, must satisfy the remaining constitutional
and prudential standing requirements. New Union, for the same
reasons faced by FLT,1 cannot redress the injury alleged under
section 6972(a)(1)(B). New Union seeks to enjoin Buena Vista
from emitting mercury from its Blue Skies power plants. How-
ever, as discussed with respect to FLT, this requested relief will
not redress New Union citizens' fear of eating fish from Lake
Tokay. In addition, RCRA does not permit actions for money dam-
1. See supra, Part I-B.
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ages, and since New Union, similar to FLT, cannot justify injunc-
tive relief, the injury alleged cannot be redressed by RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B).
Moreover, resting upon the same allegations made by FLT,
New Union has not sufficiently shown that Buena Vista's mercury
emissions "may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment. .". ."2 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). The alleged facts indicate
the opposite: that there is no imminent and substantial endanger-
ment because no one is eating contaminated fish from the Lake,
nor has anyone discontinued sport fishing in the Lake. (R. at 4.)
Therefore, the injury alleged by both Appellants is outside of the
"zone of interests" protected by section 6972(a)(1)(B). New
Union's failure to satisfy either redressability or the "zone of inter-
ests" test requires this Court to reverse the District Court's denial
of Buena Vista's motion for summary judgment against New
Union.
III. FLT AND NEW UNION ARE BARRED FROM
BRINGING THIS CITIZENS' SUIT BY THE
DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA,
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, AND 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(b).
A. The Court Must Rule on Whether The Doctrines Of Res
Judicata Or Collateral Estoppel, Bar FLT and New Union
From Bringing Their 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) Action.
The District Court erred by not determining whether the Ap-
pellant's claim was precluded by res judicata or whether any is-
sues were collaterally estopped. "A fundamental precept of
common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of
collateral estoppel and res judicata is that a right, question of fact,
distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between
the same parties or their privies.... ." Southern Pacific R.R. Co. v.
United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897) (emphasis added).
Res judicata and collateral estoppel protect defendants "from
the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves
judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by mini-
mizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions." Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). A court must first decide
2. See supra, Part I-C.
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whether res judicata or collateral estoppel bar a litigant's claim or
issues within a claim before addressing the merits of an action. To
do otherwise is in direct conflict with these policies. Therefore,
the lower court was in error in deciding not to address the issues
of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
B. The Doctrine Of Res Judicata Bars FLT And New Union
From Bringing This 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) Action.
The Appellants' claim is res judicata in light of the Blue Skies
decision, Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista Power Co., No. Civ. 98-27,
slip. op. (Coughlin Co. Sup. Ct., Jan 5, 1999).
When a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final
judgement on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to their
suit and their privies are thereafter bound not only as to every
matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which
might have been offered for that purpose.
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948). The sav-
ings clause of the RCRA, while preserving statutory or common
law rights, does not abrogate the doctrine of res judicata. See 42
U.S.C. § 6972(f). After bringing a section 6972(a)(1)(B) action, a
party may not bring a subsequent common law action, or vice-
versa, without first overcoming the preclusive barrier of res
judicata.
A subsequent claim is precluded by res judicata if the prior
decision was "(1) a final judgement on the merits, (2) by a court of
competent jurisdiction, (3) in a case involving the same parties or
privies, and (4) in a case involving the same cause of action." Her-
endeen v. Champion Int'l Corp., 525 F.2d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 1975).
Bluepeace, Inc. satisfies each of these four requirements and
therefore bars the Appellants from bringing this RCRA section
6972(a)(1)(B) suit.
1. A final judgement on the merits was rendered in the
case of Bluepeace, Inc v. Buena Vista Corp.
In Bluepeace, Inc., Buena Vista's motion for summary judge-
ment was granted on the merits. (R. at A-2.) Accordingly, the de-
cision of the Blue Skies Superior Court was a final judgment on
the merits.
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2. The Blue Skies Superior Court of Coughlin County is a
court of competent jurisdiction.
RCRA citizens' suits are not the exclusive jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts. See Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir.
1998). The citizens' suit section provides that "[any action under
paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall be brought in the district
court for the district in which the... alleged endangerment may
occur." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). However, the term "shall" "does not
affirmatively divest the state courts of their presumptive jurisdic-
tion." Davis, 148 F.3d at 612 (citing Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v.
Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990) (holding that the language
"shall have" in Title VII was not sufficient evidence that Congress
intended to divest the state courts of their presumptive jurisdic-
tion)). Therefore, the action brought by FLT and New Union could
have been brought in Blue Skies Superior Court, making that
court a court of competent jurisdiction.
Simply because Bluepeace, Inc. was a Blue Skies decision,
does not reduce the case's preclusive effect in federal court. Fed-
eral statute requires that federal courts give full faith and credit
to state court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 ("[J]udicial proceed-
ings [of any State] ... shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States ... as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken.");
Migra v. Warren City Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). There-
fore, pursuant to federal statute, this Court must give the judg-
ment in Bluepeace, Inc. the same preclusive effect that it would
have in Blue Skies.
3. FLT and New Union are privy to Bluepeace under the
doctrine of virtual representation.
A person may be bound by a prior judgment, even though not
a party, if one of the parties to the prior judgment is so closely
aligned with that person's interests as to be his "virtual represen-
tative." See Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th
Cir. 1975); see also People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 68
F.3d 172, 177 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he interests of the party in the
second suit must be 'so parallel' to the interests of the party in the
first suit so that the first party becomes the second party's virtual
representative."); United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d
996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that a strict agency relation-
ship is not necessary). Just as the doctrines of res judicata and
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collateral estoppel, virtual representation "conserve[s] judicial re-
sources, protect[s] litigants from multiple lawsuits, and foster[s]
certainty and reliance in legal relations." ITT Rayonier, 627 F.2d
at 1000.
FLT and New Union's interest in the present suit parallels
Bluepeace's interest in the prior suit. New Union, FLT, and
Bluepeace are each concerned over mercury contamination of fish
in their respective lakes. FLT and Bluepeace members recreation-
ally fish and allege that the mercury contamination prevents
them from eating fish they catch. (R. at A-4, B-2.) Similarly, New
Union's interest is to protect the interests of its citizens in being
able to eat the fish they catch sport fishing. All three parties al-
leged that the contamination is caused by emissions from Buena
Vista's power plants. (R. at A-i, B-1.) Furthermore, the fact that
each party has requested identical relief is indicative of their par-
allel interests. Whether the Appellants had notice of Bluepeace's
action is irrelevant since the Appellants' interests are so closely
aligned with Bluepeace's interests. Bluepeace adequately repre-
sented the interests of FLT and New Union in its lawsuit, vigor-
ously trying their suit against Buena Vista. Therefore, FLT and
New Union are sufficiently privy to Bluepeace under the doctrine
of virtual representation.
4. Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista Corp. involved the same
cause of action.
A party is barred from relitigating any rights against a defen-
dant "with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of
connected transactions, out of which the initial action arose." Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982). Courts must weigh
"whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, motivation,
and whether they form a convenient trial unit." Nevada v. United
States, 463 U.S. 110, 131 n.12 (1983).
FLT and New Union have raised the same claim that was al-
ready litigated by Bluepeace in the Blue Skies Superior Court.
Bluepeace attempted to enjoin Buena Vista from continuing to
emit mercury from its two power plants, just as FLT and New
Union attempt now. (R. at B-2.) The RCRA is a federalization of
the common law of public nuisance. See S. Rep. No. 96-172, at 5,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5023; Middlesex City Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders v. New Jersey, 645 F.Supp. 715, 721-22
(D.N.J. 1986). The fact that one party is bringing the claim under
RCRA, and the other under basic tort law, does not distinguish
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these claims for purposes of res judicata. See Supporters to Op-
pose Pollution v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1326-27 (7th Cir.
1992) (barring a RCRA citizens' suit where the violations alleged
were grounded in the same set of operative facts as those of a pre-
vious, and finally terminated common law action).
The Appellants alleged facts essentially identical in "time,
space, origin, and motivation" to those raised in Bluepeace, Inc.
Nevada, 463 U.S. at 130 & n.12. Bluepeace claimed that mercury
particles emitted from Buena Vista's two power plants enter the
waters of Lake Mordred contaminating fish in the lake. (R. at B-
1.) FLT and New Union bring virtually the identical cause of ac-
tion, claiming that mercury particles emitted from Buena Vista's
power plants contaminated fish in Lake Tokay. (R. at A-1.) All
parties requested a court to enjoin Buena Vista, believing that
this relief would allow them to subsequently eat fish from the
lakes. Furthermore, the interests of FLT, New Union, and
Bluepeace are sufficiently compatible that each claim could easily
have been combined to form a "convenient trial unit." Nevada,
463 U.S. at 130 n.12. Therefore, FLT and New Union's citizens'
suit is the same cause of action brought previously by Bluepeace.
C. Even If FLT And New Union's Action Is Not Res Judicata,
The Court Should Grant Buena Vista's Motion For
Summary Judgment Because The Appellants Are
Collaterally Estopped From Relitigating The Issue Of
Whether Injunctive Relief Is Appropriate.
The Blue Skies Superior Court held that enjoining Buena
Vista from continuing to emit mercury from its two power plants
was not appropriate. (R. at B-4.) The decision in Bluepeace, Inc.
collaterally estops the Appellants from relitigating this issue.
"[O]nce an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive
in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a
party to the prior litigation." Montana, 440 U.S. at 153. Collat-
eral estoppel bars a litigant where:
(1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2)
there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party
was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication;
and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to
be heard on the adjudicated issue.
United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1198 (8th Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted). While the elements of collateral estoppel
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closely mirror those of res judicata, its focus is not on whether the
causes of action are the same, but whether the issues being argued
are the same. See Next Level Communications LP v. DSC Com-
munications Corp., 179 F.3d 244, 250 (5th Cir. 1999).
All four requirements needed to collaterally estop the Appel-
lants from relitigating the issue of whether Buena Vista should be
enjoined from emitting mercury from its two Blue Skies coal-fired
power plants are satisfied. The Bluepeace, Inc. court held that in-
junctive relief was not appropriate. (R. at B-4.) Since the RCRA
does not allow private actions for monetary damages, the Appel-
lants' claim is not redressable under section 6972(a)(1)(B). See
Walls, 761 F.2d at 316. Therefore, Buena Vista's motion for sum-
mary should be granted.
1. The issue of whether injunctive relief is appropriate has
already been litigated in Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena
Vista, Corp.
FLT and New Union both seek injunctive relief, just as
Bluepeace had. (R. at A-1.) Bluepeace fully litigated the issue of
whether it was appropriate to enjoin Buena Vista from continuing
to emit mercury from its two power plants. The Blue Skies Supe-
rior Court held that injunctive relief was not appropriate since
balancing the harms of granting or denying the injunction re-
quired extensive scientific knowledge and technical prowess not
possessed by the judiciary. (R. at B-4) (reasoning that the task of
balancing these concerns is "better suited to legislative or admin-
istrative than to judicial processes") (citing Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at
870).
Even though FLT and New Union base their action on section
6972(a)(1)(B) and not common law nuisance, they still have to ar-
gue the same issue already litigated in Bluepeace, Inc. - that in-
junctive relief is appropriate. See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at
312.
2. Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista, Corp. was a final
judgment on the merits.
The issue of whether injunctive relief is appropriate was de-
cided by the Blue Skies Superior Court and was necessary to the
court's final order granting Buena Vista's motion for summary
judgment. Addressing this issue, the Bluepeace, Inc. court con-
cluded, "the fact that establishing [emissions] standards is clearly
more appropriately done with legislative or administrative
2000]
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processes than judicial processes, compels this court to refrain
from exercising its equitable powers to frame the sort of injunctive
relief sought by the plaintiffs in this case." (R. at B-4). Therefore,
the Blue Skies court's decision not to issue an injunction was a
final judgment on the merits.
3. FLT and New Union are privy to Bluepeace under the
doctrine of virtual representation.
The interests of FLT and New Union are so closely aligned to
those of Bluepeace that both were virtually represented in
Bluepeace, Inc. Collateral estoppel, like res judicata, not only bars
the same parties from relitigating issues already decided, but
their privies as well. As discussed in Part III-B-3, FLT and New
Union are privy to Bluepeace under the doctrine of virtual
representation.
4. FLT and New Union had a full and fair opportunity to
be heard.
"A party does not have an opportunity for a full and fair hear-
ing when 'procedures fall below the minimum requirements of due
process."' Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 205 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1074
(3d Cir. 1990)). Bluepeace certainly had a full and fair hearing in
Bluepeace, Inc. that comported with minimal due process require-
ments. Since FLT and New Union are virtually privy to
Bluepeace, they similarly had a full and fair opportunity to be
heard. See, e.g., Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 521 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding that police detective was in privity with the city,
and thus had a full and fair opportunity to be heard in the initial
trial).
D. The Court Must Rule On Whether 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) Bars
FLT And New Union's Citizens' Suit, And Should Hold
That FLT And New Union Are Barred.
42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) specifies the "actions prohibited" under
section 6972(a). The court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits
of the Appellants' complaint where they have failed to overcome
the actions prohibited by section 6972(b). Therefore, the court
must address the Appellants' failure to satisfy these prohibitions.
Section 6972(b)(2)(F) states that "Whenever any action is
brought under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section in a court of the
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United States, the plaintiff shall serve a copy of the complaint on
the Attorney General of the United States and with the Adminis-
trator." Neither FLT nor New Union has indicated fulfilment of
this requirement. The fact that the Record explicitly states the
parties complied with the notice requirements under section
6972(c) and the time restrictions imposed by section 6972(b)(2)(A),
further indicates that both Appellants violated the service re-
quirement under section 6972(b)(2)(F). (R. at A-1.) Failure to
comply with § 6972(b)(2)(F) deprives the court of subject matter
jurisdiction over the Appellants' § 6972(a)(1)(B) suits. See Ascon
Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir.
1989). Therefore, this court should grant Buena Vista's motion for
summary judgment against the Appellants for failing to comply
with the service requirement in section 6972(b)(2)(F).
IV. THE MERCURY EMITTED FROM BUENA VISTA'S
POWER PLANTS IS NOT "SOLID WASTE" FOR
PURPOSES OF 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
Buena Vista's mercury emissions are essentially uncontained
gaseous matter and therefore not "solid waste" for purposes of the
RCRA. In addition, airborne mercury emissions are regulated
under the CAA, not RCRA. Thus, this court should reverse the
District Court's ruling and grant Buena Vista's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
A. Buena Vista's Mercury Emissions Are Uncontained Gaseous
Matter.
The mercury emissions from Buena Vista's coal-burning
power plants are not "solid waste" because they fall within the im-
plicit exclusion of uncontained gaseous materials. RCRA's citizen
suit provision regulates the "disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste . .." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). The term "solid waste" in-
corporates all "hazardous wastes." See id. § 6903(5). Thus, a pol-
lutant classified as a "solid waste" may be within the scope of
section 6972(a)(1)(B). "Solid waste" is defined by RCRA as "any
garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water sup-
ply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other dis-
carded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained
gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining,
and agricultural operations, and from community activities ... .
Id. § 6903(27) (emphasis added).
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The plain language of the statute excludes uncontained gase-
ous matter from the definition of "solid waste." Even assuming
that this legislative definition is ambiguous, the EPA interprets
"solid waste" to exclude uncontained gaseous material. See In re:
Chem. Waste Management of Indiana, Inc., Permittee, IND 078
911 146, 1995 WL 523542, * 12 (E.P.A., Aug. 23, 1995) ("Thus, a
substance in gaseous form is not considered a solid waste under
the RCRA unless it is containerized.") (citing In re BP Chems. of
America, Lima Ohio, OHD 042 157 644, 1991 WL 208971, *4
(E.P.A., Aug. 20, 1991)). This EPA interpretation of "solid waste"
is not arbitrary and capricious and therefore must be given defer-
ence. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
A gaseous material by definition, is a substance that tends to
expand indefinitely when unconfined. See Webster's New World
Dictionary 598 (12th ed. 1968). This is precisely the characteristic
embodied by the emissions coming from the smoke stacks of
Buena Vista's power plants. These smoke stack emissions con-
taining microscopic particles of mercury immediately expand in
volume upon leaving the smoke stack. Furthermore, once in the
atmosphere, winds, rain, and other atmospheric conditions change
the composition of the gaseous matter transporting it across great
distances. Even though the mercury itself may be considered a
solid particle, the emissions coming from the smoke stacks,
treated as a whole, are uncontained gaseous matter that is not
actionable under section 6972(a)(1)(B).
B. Congress Intended The CAA, Not The RCRA, To Regulate
Uncontained Gaseous Matter Such As Buena Vista's
Mercury Emissions.
Congress' implicit exclusion of uncontained gaseous matter
reflects its intention that such emissions be regulated under the
CAA. The CAA is a pervasive environmental regulatory scheme
under which Buena Vista's emissions are admittedly covered. In
fact, the numerous limitations contained in Buena Vista's CSA
permits have the effect of limiting mercury emissions. (R. at B-2.)
These permits require weekly testing and establish fifty down-
wind ground stations to measure and monitor Buena Vista's mer-
cury emissions. (R. at B-2.) Moreover, Buena Vista's permit
includes a provision to add a mercury emissions limitation as soon
as the EPA promulgates one. (R. at B-2.) The fact that the EPA
has yet to promulgate a mercury emissions limitation applicable
to coal-fired power plants is not a proper basis for subjecting
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Buena Vista to a RCRA citizens' suit. Quite the opposite, the ac-
tions taken by Blue Skies DEP and the EPA indicate a recognition
of Congress' intention that uncontained gaseous emissions such as
Buena Vista's be regulated under the CAA, and not section
6972(a)(1)(B).
V. FLT AND NEW UNION ARE BARRED FROM
BRINGING THIS ACTION SINCE THE CAA IS
INTENDED TO REGULATE ALL AIR
POLLUTION, AND EVEN IF THEIR ACTION
IS NOT PREEMPTED, THE APPELLANTS ARE
BARRED BY BLUE SKIES AND FEDERAL LAW
FROM CHALLENGING BUENA VISTA'S PERMITS
IN AN ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
A. Congress Intended The CAA, Not The RCRA, To Regulate
Air Pollution.
RCRA was enacted to regulate ground disposal of solid and
hazardous wastes, not air pollution. See 94 Cong. House Debates
1976, at 32597, reprinted in RCRA Leg. Hist. 11 (stating that the
RCRA is intended to "protect health and the environment from...
[solid wastes] ... which are dumped on the land indiscriminately
or disposed of in the nearest landfill"). The CAA, on the other
hand, regulates air pollution under a complex and pervasive fed-
eral-state scheme. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1994). RCRA
specifically requires the EPA to "avoid duplication, to the maxi-
mum extent practicable, with the appropriate provisions of the
Clean Air Act." Id. § 6905(b)(1).
Allowing FLT and New Union to bring this action under sec-
tion 6972(a)(1)(B) is duplicative and contrary to Congress' intent
that the CAA regulate airborne mercury emissions such as Buena
Vista's. See Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. United
States Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
the plaintiffs' CWA suit where the defendants had a CAA permit
allowing the stack emissions the plaintiffs sought to enjoin). The
1990 CAA amendments specifically require the completion of
power plant mercury emissions studies. See id. § 7412(n)(1)(B).
In addition, Congress required the completion of a study deter-
mining the threshold for mercury concentrations in fish which
may be consumed without adverse health effects. See id.
§ 7412(n)(1)(C).
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Buena Vista's CSA permits recognize Congress' intent that
airborne mercury emissions be regulated under the CAA. Each
permit is over fifty pages long, containing numerous requirements
effectively limiting mercury emissions. (R. at B-3.) Moreover,
each permit requires testing for mercury emissions on a weekly
basis and measuring mercury contamination from fifty ground
stations downwind of each power plant. (R. at B-2.) Finally, sec-
tion 13, note a, of each CSA permit provides that the permits are
subject to revision if and when the EPA promulgates mercury
emissions limitations for coal-fired power plants. (R. at B-2.) The
fact is Buena Vista's mercury emissions are already heavily regu-
lated. The EPA's failure to promulgate a specific regulation for
mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants does not remove
this type of pollution from the purview of the CAA. The numerous
mercury-related requirements recognize Congress' intent that
such emissions be regulated under the CAA, consequently pre-
empting the Appellants' RCRA citizens' suit.
B. FLT And New Union Are Barred By Blue Skies And
Federal Law From Challenging The Terms Of Buena
Vista's Permits In An Enforcement Action.
Each of Buena Vista's CSA permits states, "[t]he [DEC] has
reviewed every provision of federal and state law applicable to
emissions from this facility and had determined that such law
contains no requirements applicable to it that are not reflected in
this permit." (R. at A-5.) This language effectively shields Buena
Vista from suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(f); 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(f)(1)
("[T]he permitting authority may expressly include in a ... permit
a provision stating that compliance with the conditions of the per-
mit shall be deemed compliance with any applicable require-
ments.... ."). Buena Vista cannot be expected to do anything more
than comply with the numerous requirements included in their
CSA permits, and the permit shield provision provides that they
are not required by law to do anything more. The Appellants' de-
sire for more stringent mercury emissions limitations should have
been voiced in a judicial review proceeding, not an enforcement
action. Moreover, the Appellants' petition for review must comply
with time and venue restrictions applicable to the judicial review
of permits. This Court should affirm the District Court's order of
summary judgment against the Appellants for failing to comply
with the time and venue restrictions under both Blue Skies and
federal law.
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1. FLT and New Union are challenging the terms of Buena
Vista's Clean Skies Act Permits.
"[Plroper disposition . . . requires precise characterization of
the action sought to be reviewed." District of Columbia v. Train,
533 F.2d 1250, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Appellants claim that
airborne mercury emissions from Buena Vista's two power plants
are ending up in Lake Tokay resulting in their inability to eat fish
from the Lake. (R. at A-2.) Buena Vista's permits already contain
numerous limitations effectively reducing the amount of mercury
emitted. Additionally, each permit contains terms requiring the
monitoring and reporting of mercury emissions, as well as a provi-
sion to incorporate a mercury emission limitation specific to coal-
fired power plants as soon as one is promulgated by the EPA. (R.
at B-2.) While couched in terms of a RCRA "imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment" suit, the Appellants are challenging the
terms of Buena Vista's CSA permits.
The Appellants are essentially arguing that Buena Vista's
mercury emissions limitations are insufficient in an attempt to
end-run Blue Skies and federal law that would prohibit such a
challenge. The Court cannot allow the Appellants to artfully
plead around the explicit review provisions of the CSA and the
CAA. See Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 833
(1976) (holding under Title VII that "[it would require the sus-
pension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its
careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by art-
ful pleading"); Waste Management of Illinois, Inc. v. EPA., 714
F.Supp. 340, 346 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("[R]estrictions on [a court's] sub-
ject matter jurisdiction cannot be circumvented by artful pleading.
'To view the matter otherwise would be to allow the complainant's
own description of its theory to determine the forum with jurisdic-
tion."') (quoting United Trans. Union v. Norfolk & Western R.R.
Co., 822 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The CAA contains a
complex and detailed scheme for the judicial review of permits,
placing an emphasis on the finality of administrative decisions.
See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C. Cir.
1985). Allowing the Appellants to artfully plead around this
scheme is wholly incongruous with Congress' intent.
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2. FLT and New Union are barred by Blue Skies law
which restricts the time and venue for judicial review
of CSA permits.
The CSA, requires that: "A petition to review a permit issued
under this chapter may be filed only in the Superior Court of
Goodview County within sixty days after the permit is issued. A
permit shall not be subject to judicial review or challenge in civil
or criminal proceedings for enforcement." B.S.R.C. 15:
§ 1963(b)(2) (emphasis added).
This Court is required to defer to Blue Skies' judicial review
provision. See Action for Rational Transit v. West Side Highway
Project by its Exec. Dir. Bridwell, 699 F.2d 614, 616-17 (2d Cir.
1983) (holding that plaintiffs were barred from challenging a final
action of the New York State Department of Environmental Con-
trol under the CAA, where plaintiffs could have sought review
under New York law but did not); League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc.
v. Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164, 1173 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the CAA section 304(a)(1)
since the "challenge to the [permit] ... should have been pursued
through the administrative review procedures set forth as part of
the [Nevada SIP]"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6) (requiring a
state air pollution permit program to include "an opportunity for
judicial review in State court of the final permit action by... any
... person who could obtain judicial review of that action under
applicable law").
Courts must strictly adhere to statutory time limits for judi-
cial review of environmental permits in order to ensure the final-
ity of complex administrative decisions and to prevent sparse
administrative resources from being wasted eternally litigating
the terms of a permit. See, e.g., Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA,
799 F.2d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The requirements show a [leg-
islative] decision to impose statutory finality on agency actions
that we, as a court may not second-guess.") (citing Eagle-Picher
Indus., 759 F.2d at 911; Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 935
(D.C. Cir. 1979)). Failure to meet this statutory time limit strips
the court of jurisdiction to review the challenged permit. See Ha-
waiian Elec. Co. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1984).
The Appellants' section 6972(a)(1)(B) suit is in direct violation
of Blue Skies law. Not only have the Appellants brought this ac-
tion in the wrong venue and well beyond the sixty day time limit,
but they have raised their permit challenge in a civil enforcement
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proceeding. Therefore, this Court should affirm the District
Court's order of summary judgment for Buena Vista. See, e.g.,
Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 584 F.2d 862, 863 (8th Cir. 1978)
(dismissing petition for review regarding issuance of a CWA per-
mit brought four days after the statutory time limit elapsed).
3. FLT and New Union's citizens' suit is also barred by
federal law restricting the time and venue for judicial
review of a permit.
The CAA judicial review provision allows for review in the
United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit of "any
• . .final action.., within sixty days from the date notice of such
... action appears in the Federal Register, except that if such peti-
tion is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then
any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within
sixty days after such grounds arise." 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (em-
phasis added). Just as under Blue Skies law, the CAA prohibits
judicial review of a final action in a civil or criminal enforcement
action. See id. § 7607(b)(2). Blue Skies' issuance of two permits to
Buena Vista constituted a "final action" by the DEC. See Hawai-
ian Elec. Co., 723 F.2d at 1445 (reasoning that the EPA's issuance
of a CAA Prevention of Significant Deterioration permit consti-
tuted a final action from which the plaintiffs had sixty days to
seek review). Just as this Court must conclude under Blue Skies
law, the Appellants are prohibited from challenging Buena Vista's
permits in a civil enforcement action, and similarly have failed to
raise their challenge in the correct venue and within the required
time limit prescribed by the CAA.
In addition, the Appellants may not claim that the "belated
review" provision within section 7607(b)(1) allows this action be-
cause its grounds do no arise solely after sixty days from the issu-
ance of Buena Vista's permits. In promulgating these judicial
review provisions, "Congress ... struck a careful balance between
the need for administrative finality and the need to provide for
subsequent review in the event of unexpected difficulties." Na-
tional Mining Assoc. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 70 F.3d
1345, 1350 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Review of a petition based on
grounds clearly available within sixty days of the permits' issu-
ance is not allowed under section 7607(b)(1). See id. (holding that
permitting review under similar circumstances "would thwart
Congress' well-laid plan"); In re: Woodkiln, Inc., CAA-HQ-111-001,
1997 WL 406530, n.13 (E.P.A., July 17, 1997) (holding that appel-
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lant failed to show "how or why the current state of knowledge is
so fundamentally different as to represent new grounds for re-
view" that could not have been asserted within sixty days of the
EPA's final action).
Buena Vista obtained its CSA permits in 1998. (R. at B-1.)
They have been in compliance with all mercury-related terms
since issuance of the permits. (R. at B-2.) In late 1998, Bluepeace
unsuccessfully brought suit against Buena Vista based on grounds
nearly identical to the Appellants'. (R. at B-1.) Bluepeace based
its suit on tests conducted by DEC indicating that mercury from
Buena Vista's power plants was contaminating fish in Lake Mor-
dred. (R. at B-1.) The EPA's study, allegedly indicating that mer-
cury from Buena Vista's plants is also contaminating fish in Lake
Tokay, does not significantly add to the current state of knowledge
concerning Buena Vista's mercury emissions. See American As-
soc. of Meat Processors v. Costle, 556 F.2d 875, 876 (8th Cir. 1977)
(citations omitted); 1990 CAA Leg. Hist. 731, 779. Since FLT and
New Union fail to allege grounds solely arising after sixty days,
this Court must affirm the District Court's granting of Buena
Vista's motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Buena Vista respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the District Court's decisions that FLT
lacks standing, and that both Appellants are barred by the CAA
and Blue Skies law from bringing this citizens' suit. Buena Vista
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's
decisions that New Union has standing, and that Buena Vista's
mercury emissions are "solid waste" for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B). Finally, Buena Vista respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the District Court's decision not to address
whether the Appellants are barred by the doctrines of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, and section 6972(b), and find that the Appel-
lants are barred.
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION
FRIENDS OF LAKE TOKAY, INC.,
Plaintiff
STATE OF NEW UNION,
Civ. No. 99-7030
Intervenor
ORDER
V.
BUENA VISTA POWER CO.,
Defendant.
Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc. (FLT), a not-for-profit corporation
organized for the protection of Lake Tokay in the State of New
Union, sent a notice to Buena Vista Power Co. (Buena Vista), the
Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the State of Blue Skies of the endangerment
FLT alleges originates from two power plants owned and oper-
ated by Buena Vista in Blue Skies, and of FLT's intention to file
an action against Buena Vista to abate the endangerment under
section 7002(a)(1)(B) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), 40 U.S.C. § 6972. Ninety-five days thereafter, FLT
filed this action under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) against Buena
Vista, seeking an injunction requiring Buena Vista to cease all
emissions of mercury from its plants. The State of New Union
filed a motion to intervene in the action pursuant to RCRA section
7002(b)(2)(E) and FRCP Rule 24, which motion was granted.
The complaints allege, and Buena Vista admits, that Buena
Vista owns and operates two mine-mouth, coal-fired power plants
in Blue Skies. The complaints allege, and Buena Vista admits,
that the coal burned in the plants contains mercury, and that af-
ter combustion of the coal, minute particles of mercury are re-
leased up the plants' stacks in smoke and stack gases. The
complaints allege, and Buena Vista admits, that most of the mer-
cury particles are captured in air pollution control equipment op-
erated by Buena Vista, but that some of those particles escape into
the atmosphere. The complaints allege, and Buena Vista denies,
that many of those particles are transported through the atmos-
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phere to airspace over the State of New Union, where they fall to
the surface. The complaints allege, and Buena Vista denies, that
some of the particles fall directly into Lake Tokay and that others
fall onto land in the watershed of Lake Tokay, from which they
eventually are washed into Lake Tokay.
The complaints allege, and Buena Vista admits, that the New
Union Department of Public Health has issued a health advisory,
giving notice that fish living in Lake Tokay contain levels of mer-
cury that, if eaten on a weekly basis, could cause mercury poison-
ing in humans. The health advisory bans the sale of fish from the
Lake and advises the public against consumption of fish from the
Lake. While Buena Vista admits the health advisory was issued
and admits its contents, Buena Vista denies the validity of the
advisory, the conclusions reached by it and the acts alleged in it.
The complaints allege, and Buena Vista admits, that EPA has
conducted studies which conclude that most of the mercury in
Lake Tokay originates from Buena Vista's two power plants in
Blue Skies. Although Buena Vista admits EPA's conduct of the
studies and the contents of the published results of the studies, it
denies the validity of the studies and the truth of the published
results of the studies.
FLT and New Union contend that the mercury contamination
of fish in Lake Tokay and the health risk it poses, if fish from the
Lake are consumed by humans, are just the sort of endanger-
ments that RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) was designed to address.
Two members of FLT submitted affidavits averring that they have
fished recreationally in Lake Tokay for over two decades and still
fish there for pleasure. They aver they no longer eat the fish there
because of the health advisories.
The parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment.
FLT and New Union request summary judgment that the particu-
late mercury that is emitted by the Buena Vista plants is a haz-
ardous waste. Buena Vista requests summary judgment that both
FLT and New Union lack standing; that relief is precluded under
RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) because emissions from the plants are
regulated under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.; and
because litigation already concluded between Buena Vista and
Bluepeace, Inc. precludes this action.
Based on evidence adduced by FLT and New Union, and not
contested by Buena Vista, at the summary judgment hearing, I
hold that the particulate mercury emitted by the Buena Vista
plants is solid waste, as that term is used in RCRA section
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7002(a)(1)(B), and accordingly grant their motion for summary
judgment. It should be emphasized, however, that their motion
did not address whether that waste ever reached Lake Tokay or
caused an endangerment there, conclusions which Buena Vista
steadfastly contests as a factual matter and which were not re-
solved at the summary judgment stage.
Because the only two members of FLT who presented evi-
dence on their injuries from the alleged acts of Buena Vista admit-
ted that they were in no danger from mercury in the Lake, I find
that FLT has no standing to sue Buena Vista under RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B) and grant Buena Vista's motion for summary judg-
ment to that extent. Because a state need not prove standing, I
deny Buena Vista's motion to that extent.
Emissions from Buena Vista's two plants are extensively reg-
ulated under the Clean Air Act. Indeed, Blue Skies has recently
issued Title V permits for those plants under that Act. Those per-
mits did not contain limitations on mercury emissions. Plaintiffs
here could have sought judicial review of those permits and they
did not. Under Blue Skies law those who could, but did not, seek
judicial review of permits may not contest their terms in subse-
quent enforcement or other litigation. The present litigation is
merely an attempt to end run this basic limitation of administra-
tive law. Accordingly, I grant Buena Vista's motion for summary
judgment on this basis against both FLT and New Union.
Buena Vista also contends that concluded litigation in the
case of Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista Power Co., No. Civ. 98-27,
slip. op. (Coughlin Co. Sup. Ct., Jan. 5, 1999), attached hereto as
Appendix I, bars this litigation under RCRA section 7002(b) or the
doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Because I have
already granted Buena Vista's motion for summary judgment on
dispositive issues, I do not reach this motion.
I. The Particulate Emissions as Solid or Hazardous Waste
In order for the mercury particles emitted from Buena Vista's
plants to be subject to suit under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B), they
must be solid or hazardous waste, as defined under RCRA. RCRA
section 1004(5) defines hazardous waste as a solid waste which
has characteristics that are hazardous. EPA's regulations also de-
fine hazardous waste as a solid waste exhibiting hazardous char-
acteristics or contained on a list of hazardous waste in EPA's
regulations. 40 CFR § 261.3. The basic question, then, is whether
the particles are solid waste EPA defines solid waste in 40 CFR
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§ 261.2. A solid waste is discarded material. 40 CFR
§ 261.2(a)(1). A material is discarded if it is abandoned, recycled
or inherently waste-like. 40 CFR § 261.2(a)(2). The mercury par-
ticles are not recycled or, in terms of EPA's regulations, inherently
waste-like. 40 CFR § 261.2(c) and (d). They are abandoned, how-
ever, if they are disposed of. 40 CFR § 261.2(b)(1). They are dis-
posed of if they are discharged or placed onto or on land or water
such that they enter the environment, air or water. RCRA
§ 1004(3). This seems a good description of what happens to the
mercury particles; they are discharged out of the plants' stacks
and end up in the Lake or the surrounding land, from which they
eventually enter the Lake.
Buena Vista protests that RCRA section 1004(27) defines
"solid waste" to include only "solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained
gaseous material." It argues this means air pollutants are a solid
waste only if they are discharged into enclosed air, and not if they
are discharged into open air. Its argument ignores the plain
meaning of the statute. The only material that must be dis-
charged to enclosed space to be a solid waste is gas. The mercury
particles at issue are particles; solids, not gas. To contend they
are not solid particles ignores the advancements of modern sci-
ence. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790
(1959).
Buena Vista also advances here the same arguments that it
uses to assert that the pervasive regulatory scheme for controlling
air pollution under the federal Clean Air Act occupies the field of
air pollution, leaving no room for RCRA's public nuisance-type en-
dangerment provision to operate in that field. These arguments
don't depend on whether the mercury emissions are solid waste
under RCRA. And those arguments aren't relevant to whether
mercury emissions are solid waste under RCRA. That question is
purely a matter of statutory interpretation, one that is relevant,
among other issues, to whether EPA can use RCRA to regulate air
emissions.
Because endangerments caused by solid waste are actionable
under RCRA section 7002, it is unnecessary to determine if the
mercury particles are hazardous.
II. Standing.
As an environmental advocacy group, FLT cannot have stand-
ing on its own, but may have standing to represent its members
who have standing. For its members to have standing, they must
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1) suffer actual injury from the complained of action; 2) the injury
must be fairly traceable to the complained of action; and 3) the
injury must be redressible by judicial action, Valley Forge Chris-
tian College, v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Finally, the injury must be within
the "zone of interest" sought to be protected by the statute, Associ-
ation of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
To meet this test, FLT submits the affidavits of two of its
members, Steven Jones and Artimus Winfred. Their affidavits
are similar in relevant regards. They both live near, but not on
the Lake. They have both used the Lake for sports fishing for
many years. Until the Department of Public Health issued the
health advisory, they kept some of the fish they caught and re-
turned others to the Lake. The fish they kept they ate or gave to
their friends to eat. After the health advisory they have continued
to fish, but they no longer keep or eat any of the fish. They were
afraid to eat or have their friends eat the fish because of the mer-
cury contamination discussed in the health advisory. The only
thing they complain about in their affidavits is their inability to
eat fish from the Lake.
Jones and Winfred suffer an injury here; their enjoyment in
fishing has been diminished because they can no longer eat the
fish they catch in the Lake. Buena Vista does not contest this. It
remains to be proven whether the injury is fairly traceable to
Buena Vista's emissions and whether the injury is redressable by
court order. The problem is that the injury is not within the "zone
of interest" protected by the statute. The purpose of RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B) is to redress endangerments. The mercury in the
fish may endanger health, but only if the fish are eaten. These
plaintiffs do not eat the fish and therefore are not endangered by
the contamination. Their loss of enjoyment in fishing is not the
interest protected by section 7002 or even by other parts of RCRA.
It may be that Jones and Winfred, or even other members of FLT,
could aver injuries within the zone of interests protected by sec-
tion 7002, but they did not.
Alternatively, the injuries suffered by Jones and Winfred are
not redressable under RCRA section 7002. The injuries they com-
plain of are not being able to eat or distribute fish they catch in
the Lake. Those inabilities are undoubtedly inconveniences and
even may have a modest economic value. That makes them
redressable in an action at law for money damages. One of the
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bedrock requirements for the equitable remedy of injunction is
that relief is not available in an action at law. Since these plain-
tiffs have a rather minor claim for money damages, they have an
adequate remedy at law in a traditional tort suit and may not be
granted injunctive relief. RCRA section 7002 vests this court with
authority to grant injunctive relief, but not to award money dam-
ages. Their injuries are not redressable under RCRA section
7002. Davies v. National Cooperative Refinery Association, 963
F.Supp. 990, 999 (D. Kan. 1997).
New Union, on the other hand, is the state and not a private
party. As a state it does not need to plead standing; it automati-
cally has standing to sue for any injuries alleged to occur in the
public domain within its boundaries. New Union avers in its com-
plaint that Lake Tokay is within the public domain and is wholly
within its boundaries. Buena Vista does not contest this.
III. The Effect of Regulation under the Clean Air Act
Plaintiffs seek to use the citizen suit provision of RCRA to ad-
dress an air pollution problem. This raises the important question
of whether Congress intended to supplant detailed and pervasive
regulation of air pollution under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42
U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., with the general, public nuisance-type
RCRA section 7001(a)(1)(B). Regulation of Buena Vista's plants
under the CAA is real, detailed and pervasive. It starts with the
Blue Skies state implementation plan provisions regulating emis-
sions from power plants to meet the national ambient air quality
standards for particulate matter. See CAA § 109 and 110, 42
U.S.C. § 7409 and 7410. Particulate matter includes particles
composed of or containing mercury. CAA sections 401 to 416, 42
U.S.C. § 7451 to 7451o, regulate sulfur oxide emissions from over
one hundred coal fired power plants, including Buena Vista's two
plants, with the intention of controlling the long range transport
of pollutants from state to state. Although this regulation is di-
rected at reduction in sulfur oxide emissions, Buena Vista's ex-
pert testified at the summary judgment hearing that reduction in
sulfur oxide emissions would normally also lead to a reduction in
mercury emissions. FLT and New Union did not present evidence
to the contrary. Finally, CAA section 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, di-
rects EPA to promulgate emissions standards for hazardous air
pollutants, including mercury. That section specifically directs
EPA to study the public health impact of fossil fuel fired power
plant emissions, CAA section 112(n)(1), and directs The National
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Institute of Environmental Health Sciences to determine a thresh-
old for mercury concentrations in fish to protect public health,
CAA section 112(n)(2). Moreover, CAA section 112(m) requires
EPA to study the effects of the deposit in large water bodies of
hazardous air pollutants from long range transport of such pollu-
tants, which would include mercury, and to promulgate further
limitations on emissions of such pollutants, if necessary to protect
public health. EPA has promulgated emissions limitations for
mercury under CAA section 112, but they do not apply to power
plants. 40 CFR § 61.50 to .55. EPA has also promulgated stan-
dards governing emissions from fossil fueled power plants con-
structed after the 1970s, under CAA section 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
Because Buena Vista's plants were built in the 1980s, they are
governed by these standards, but the standards contain no limita-
tions on mercury emissions. 40 CFR § 60.40 to 40a. Finally, all
requirements established under the CAA are to be included in per-
mits issued to particular sources of air pollution, CAA § 501 to
507, 42 U.S.C. §7661 to 7661f. Such permits may be issued by
EPA or a state with an approved permit program. For a state to
have an approved program, it must provide the opportunity for
judicial review of permits by interested parties, section 502(b)(6).
Moreover, section 504(f) authorized EPA to promulgate regula-
tions establishing that compliance with a permit constitutes com-
pliance with the CAA itself. EPA regulations provide for
activation of this so-called "permit shield" provision if the permit
issuing authority determines that no requirements, other than
those placed in the permit, are applicable. 40 CFR § 70.6(f). Blue
Skies included in the preambles to the Buena Vista permits the
following language: "The Department has reviewed every provi-
sion of federal and state law applicable to emissions from this fa-
cility and has determined that such law contains no requirements
applicable to it that are not reflected in this permit"
EPA has approved Blue Skies' CAA permit program. The
first two CAA permits that Blue Skies issued were to the Buena
Vista power plants. Those permits contain detailed emission limi-
tations on particulate matter, sulfur oxides, and nitrogen oxides.
They require Buena Vista to conduct weekly monitoring of mer-
cury in its emissions and of mercury deposition, from its plants'
emissions, at various locations in Blue Skies. They note that they
will be modified to contain any limitations of mercury emissions
that may be necessary to implement any emissions limitations of
mercury that EPA may promulgate under CAA section 112.
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In contrast, RCRA contemplates standards for regulation of
air pollution emissions from facilities that treat, store or dispose of
hazardous waste, not from facilities that emit hazardous waste
into the atmosphere. RCRA § 3004(n). Buena Vista's plants do
not treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste. Moreover, RCRA
section 1006(b)(1) directs EPA to integrate the administration and
enforcement of RCRA and the CAA to avoid duplication.
Under both RCRA and the CAA, permits issued by EPA are
subject to judicial review, but only if a petition for review is filed
within 90 days after permit issuance. Moreover, the terms of a
permit cannot be challenged in a judicial enforcement proceeding.
RCRA § 7006 (b) and CAA § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b) and 7607(b).
It is not surprising that efforts to use RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B)
to challenge the terms of a RCRA permit, in an end run around
these limitations, have been roundly rejected. Chemical Weapons
Working Group, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485
(10th Cir. 1997); Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Technologies Indus-
tries, 3 F.3d 1174 (6th Cir. 1993); Palumbo v. Waste Technologies
Industries, 989 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1993). Attempts to use enforce-
ment or citizen suit provisions to attack the terms of EPA issued
permits, in end runs around limitations on judicial review in other
environmental statutes, have been similarly rejected. Delaware
Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256 (3rd
Cir. 1991) (CAA). Finally, attempts to use federal enforcement or
citizen suit provisions to attack the terms of state issued permits
have been rejected. General Motors v. EPA, 168 F.3d 1377 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); United States v. Gulf States Steel Co., 1999 WL 381075
(N.D. Ala.).
To be sure, the situation here is not on all fours with the cited
cases. They all concerned attempts to use the enforcement or citi-
zen suit provisions of a statute to circumvent limitations on judi-
cial review in the same statute. Here plaintiffs attempt to use the
judicial review provisions to circumvent limitations on judicial re-
view in a different statute. This difference is immaterial, how-
ever, for three reasons. First, the citizen suit provisions do not
grant jurisdiction to the district courts for judicial review of state
permit issuance. This is well established. General Motors v. EPA,
168 F.3d 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1999); PIRG v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3rd Cir. 1990); United States v. Gulf States Steel
Co., 1999 WL 381075 (N.D. Ala.); NRDC v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 702 F.Supp. 690 (D. Ill. 1988); Connecticut Fund for the En-
vironment v. Job Printing Co., Inc., 623 F.Supp. 207 (D. Conn.
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1985). Second, the Blue Skies air pollution statute, modeled on
the CAA, provides for judicial review of the permits and bars chal-
lenge to their terms thereafter. (1) Plaintiffs could have sought
judicial review of the permits after they were issued. Plaintiffs
did not do so and are barred by the state statute from doing so
now. The same result would be reached if EPA had issued the
permits under the CAA. See CAA § 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(2). Plaintiffs argue that because neither Buena Vista
nor Blue Skies gave plaintiffs notice of the issuance of the permits,
Buena Vista is estopped from arguing they are barred from chal-
lenge at this time. They cite no requirement that Buena Vista or
Blue Skies give them notice of the permit issuance. Indeed, Blue
Skies gave public notice of its proposal by publication in newspa-
pers of general circulation in the state and by sending notices to
those requesting them, as required in its regulations approved by
EPA as meeting the requirements of CAA section 502(b)(6). 42
U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6). Blue Skies also provided notification to EPA
and contiguous states, as required in CAA section 505(a). 42
U.S.C. § 7661d(a). New Union is not contiguous to Blue Skies.
Third, Congress intended to regulate air pollution under the
Clean Air Act, not under the public nuisance provision of RCRA.
Indeed, Congress spoke in the Clean Air Act to the precise prob-
lem plaintiffs raise here. It may be plaintiffs' wish to use RCRA
because EPA has not acted yet under the CAA or they are not
satisfied with EPA's actions. If so, the CAA citizen suit provision
gives them recourse against EPA. CAA § 304(a)(2) or 307(b), 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) or 7607(b).
For all these reasons, it seems clear that Congress has en-
acted the CAA as a comprehensive, detailed and pervasive scheme
to regulate air pollution. It certainly occupies the field of air pol-
lution to the extent of precluding the existence of any federal com-
mon law of nuisance for interstate air pollution. City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 450 U.S. 304 (1981). By the same token it
also seems clear that Congress intended the CAA to preclude use
of the nuisance-like provision of RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) to
regulate air pollution. At the very least, it prevents courts from
using their equitable discretion to fashion injunctive relief under
that provision to regulate air pollution. Wienberger v. Romero
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
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IV. Effect of State Court Action.
Buena Vista moves to dismiss this action because the issue
has already been litigated in a state court action, Bluepeace, Inc.
v. Buena Vista Power Co., No. Civ. 98-27, slip op. (Coughlin Co.
Sup. Ct., Jan 5, 1999), attached hereto as Appendix I. It argues
that RCRA section 7002(b) and the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel bar the state court action bars this action. I do
not reach this complicated issue, since I have dismissed the action
on other grounds.
Romulus N. Remus
District Court Judge
1. "A petition to review a permit issued under this chapter
may be filed only in the Superior Court of Goodview County
within sixty days after the permit is issued. A permit shall not be
subject to judicial review or challenge in civil or criminal proceed-
ings for enforcement." B.S.R.C. 15: § 1963(b)(2).
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APPENDIX B
SUPERIOR COURT
COUGHLIN COUNTY
STATE OF BLUE SKIES
Bluepeace, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
FINDINGS OF FACT
V.
Buena Vista Power Co.,
Defendant.
1. Bluepeace, Inc. is a not-for-profit corporation organized
under the laws of Blue Skies for the purpose of protecting the nat-
ural resources and environment of the state for the good of its
members and of the citizens of the state.
2. Buena Vista Power Co. is a public utility corporation or-
ganized under the laws of Blue Skies for the purpose of generating
electricity and distributing it to the citizens of the state.
3. Buena Vista owns and operates two coal mines in the
state. At each coal mine it also owns and operates a power plant,
which burns coal from the mine to generate electricity.
4. The coal burned by Buena Vista has been found to contain
trace amounts of mercury in tests conducted both by Buena Vista
and by the Blue Skies Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion. The stack emissions from both of its plants have also been
found to contain trace amounts of mercury in tests conducted by
Buena Vista and by the DEC.
5. Tests conducted by the DEC also establish that mercury
emitted from the stacks of Buena Vista's two power plants enters
the waters of Lake Mordred, the largest lake in Blue Skies, both
by falling from the atmosphere directly into the Lake and by fall-
ing on land in the Lake's watershed, from which it is washed into
the Lake. A study of Lake Mordred conducted by the DEC con-
cluded that emissions from the two Buena Vista plants were the
major sources of mercury in the Lake. The study also concluded
that mercury bioaccumulated in fish in the Lake, reaching levels
unsafe for human consumption. Based on the results of the Study,
the Blue Skies Department of Public Health issued a health advi-
sory, banning sale and consumption of fish from the Lake.
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6. In 1998 the DEC issued air pollution permits to Buena
Vista's two plants pursuant to the Blue Sky Clean Skies Act,
B.S.R.C. 15: § 1900 et seq. The permits are each over fifty pages in
length, containing numerous requirements, including emission
limitations on particulate matter, sulfur oxides and nitrogen ox-
ides. Compliance with these limitations has the effect of also lim-
iting emissions of mercury. The permits require weekly testing of
the stacks for mercury emissions and establish fifty ground sta-
tions downwind from each plant to measure ground deposition of
mercury and other emissions from the plant. Five of these sta-
tions are on and around Lake Mordred. Section 13, note a, in each
permit provides that they will be modified to add an emissions
limitation on mercury if and when EPA promulgates mercury lim-
itations applicable to coal fired power plants.
7. The permits issued to Buena Vista require it to conduct
both periodic and continuous testing to determine whether the
plants comply with the emissions limitations contained in the per-
mits. The results of those tests indicate that it has been in compli-
ance with those limitations since the permits were issued.
8. Bluepeace has 58 members who live adjacent to or near
Lake Mordred. All of them have fished in Lake Mordred and/or
eaten fish from the Lake. Seventeen of them have continued to
eat fish from the Lake after the Department of Public Health is-
sued its health advisory banning the eating of fish from the Lake.
9. Bluepeace filed a complaint on behalf of its members, al-
leging that Buena Vista's mercury emissions constituted trespass,
public nuisance and private nuisance and seeking an injunction
banning further emissions of mercury from the plants or limiting
them to levels that will protect public health.
10. Neither Bluepeace nor its members sought judicial review
of the permits issued to the Buena Vista plants, authorized by
B.S.R.C. 15: § 1963(b)(2).
ANALYSIS OF LAW AND EQUITY
Buena Vista moves for summary judgment for two reasons.
First, Bluepeace's action, although sounding in tort, is in reality a
challenge to the failure of the permits issued by the DEC to Buena
Vista to contain emission limitations on mercury. Because judi-
cial review of permits cannot be had in enforcement actions,
Buena Vista contends it cannot be had in this tort action. Second,
regulation of air pollution under the Clean Skies Act is so perva-
sive, detailed, and technical that it displaces the common law of
torts as it might otherwise apply to air pollution.
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B.S.R.C. 15: section 1963(b)(2) is quite specific: "A petition to
review a permit issued under this chapter may be filed only in the
Superior Court of Goodview County within sixty days after the
permit is issued. A permit shall not be subject to judicial review
in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement." If this action
seeks judicial review, it is in the wrong court and is barred by the
sixty day statute of limitations. While the action is not styled as
one seeking judicial review, it does ask the court to act in place of
the DEC to establish emission limitations for mercury at the two
Buena Vista facilities. Other courts have found similar actions to
be end runs around limitations placed on judicial review and have
accordingly dismissed the actions. See Palumbo v. Waste Technol-
ogies Industries, 989 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1993). Bluepeace argues
that it is not contesting the terms of the permits and that its ac-
tion is not an enforcement action because it does not seek to en-
force the permits. Indeed, Bluepeace does not mention the
permits in its complaint. Bluepeace argues further that holding
that its action is one seeking judicial review would be tantamount
to holding that the air pollution permit system replaces tort law
with regard to damages created by air pollution. There is a good
deal of sense in this argument. Before deciding the judicial review
issue, then, it may be profitable to examine the issue of whether
the Clean Skies Act permit program does displace tort law with
regard to air pollution caused damage.
The regulation of air pollution is a complicated, technical and
expensive business. It requires reconciling many competing pub-
lic interests. State and federal legislatures have labored mightily
for four decades to develop an appropriate regulatory framework
for the endeavor. The result is literally hundreds of pages of stat-
ute and thousands of pages of regulations. They lead to permits
for each of the plants at issue here with over fifty pages of require-
ments, prohibitions, and limitations. The permits are detailed
and intrusive. For instance, they specify to the gallon how much
water must be sprayed each day on a two hundred foot gravel road
at one of the plants. Expecting a court to regulate on its own in
such a context without doing damage to this interwoven regula-
tory scheme may be expecting too much of a court.
Reviewing the considerations that go into the establishment
of emission limitations puts this into the perspective of this action.
Emissions limitations reflect the reduction in pollution emission
that can be achieved by specific technologies. Thus fashioning an
emission limitation requires an understanding of the technologies
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and the extent to which they can be utilized by coal fired power
plants. It also requires evaluation of the economic consequences
of using the technology. This could be quite different if the tech-
nology is required only of one plant or of all plants. If an expen-
sive technology is required of one plant and not other plants, the
one plant would be at a competitive disadvantage and might be
put out of business. If an expensive technology is required of all
plants, it could raise the price of electricity beyond the reach of
some segments of the consuming public, with reverberating conse-
quences. Pollution reduction technology also has secondary ef-
fects that must be understood and evaluated. They use electricity
or reduce electric generating capacity; they produce solid or liquid
waste byproducts; they may use hazardous materials. Technolo-
gies vary in their operational reliability, requiring different
amounts of downtime for maintenance. Sorting out all of these
factors to determine an optimum technology is a task much better
suited to legislative or administrative processes than to judicial
processes. And the task does not end with choosing an optimum
technology. Once a technology has been chosen, its performance
level must be established by testing and analysis that can be du-
plicated by public and private samplers and laboratories. This re-
quires an understanding of analytical chemistry as well as the
subtleties of sampling, sample preparation and sample preserva-
tion. Again, this task is better suited to legislative or administra-
tive than to judicial processes.
Bluepeace reminds us there is another side to the equation:
the adverse effects that mercury emissions have on the public
health. While Bluepeace is correct, the evaluation of the public
health effects of these emissions and balancing that effect against
the costs and burdens of corrective technology is yet another set of
scientific, medical, economic, and social factors that is more suited
to legislative or administrative than to judicial processes.
Under just such circumstances the court in Boomer v. Atlan-
tic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970), concluded that it would be improvident to grant an injunc-
tion requiring adequate air pollution controls on a cement plant
causing damage to its neighbors' property, as long as the company
paid them the cost of permanent damage to their property.
It seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollution will de-
pend on technical research in great depth; on a carefully bal-
anced consideration of the economic impact of close regulation;
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and of the actual effect on public health. It is likely to require
massive public expenditure and to demand more than any local
community can accomplish and to depend on regional and inter-
state controls.
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of
private litigation and it seems manifest that the judicial estab-
lishment is neither equipped in the limited nature of any judg-
ment it can pronounce nor prepare to lay down and implement
an effective policy for the elimination of air pollution.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
There is another reason here to reach that result. The Clean
Skies Act prohibits the DEC from establishing technology stan-
dards more stringent than required by the federal Clean Air Act
for Blue Skies' permitting and other air pollution programs to be
approved to operate in lieu of federal programs. B.S.R.C. 15:
1925(a) ("In fulfilling its duties to promulgate standards for clas-
ses and categories of air pollution sources based on technological
feasibility or other such grounds, the Department shall not re-
quire that air pollution sources meet standards that are more
stringent or costly than standards such class or category of air pol-
lution sources are required to meet nationally under regulations
promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency.") There is no requirement in the federal act that Blue
Skies regulate mercury emissions in advance of rulemaking by the
federal EPA to do so under section 112 of the federal statute.
That, of course, is no prohibition on the courts doing so. But it
suggests a legislative policy of not pushing air pollution control
requirements on Blue Skies industry beyond the national norm.
That, coupled with the fact that establishing such standards is
clearly more appropriately done with legislative or administrative
processes than with judicial processes, compels this court to re-
frain from exercising its equitable powers to frame the sort of in-
junctive relief sought by plaintiffs in this case.
At the close of the summary judgment hearing, the court in-
formed plaintiffs of its inclination to deny injunctive relief and in-
vited them within ten days to amend their complaint to request
money damages. Ten days have passed and the plaintiffs have
filed no motion to amend their complaint. Accordingly, defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment is granted on the grounds
discussed above.
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APPENDIX C
28 U.S.C. § 1738. State and Territorial statutes and judicial
proceedings; full faith and credit.
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Posses-
sion of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated
by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such
State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or
admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territo-
ries and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the
court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a
judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof,
so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
or Possession from which they are taken.
42 U.S.C. § 6903. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(5) The term "hazardous waste" means a solid waste, or com-
bination of solid wastes, which because of its quality, concentra-
tion, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may -
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortal-
ity or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating revers-
ible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human
health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, trans-
ported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
(15) The term "person" means an individual, trust, firm, joint
stock company, corporation (including a government corporation),
partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, politi-
cal subdivision of a State, or any interstate body and shall include
each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United
States.
(27) The term "solid waste" means any garbage, refuse,
sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded mate-
rial, including solid, liquid semisolid, or contained gaseous mate-
rial resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and
agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does
not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid
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or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial dis-
charges which are point sources subject to permits under section
1342 of Title 33, or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material
as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat.
923).
42 U.S.C. § 6905. Application of chapter and integration with
other Acts.
(b) Integration with other Acts.
(1) The Administrator shall integrate all provisions of this
chapter for purposes of administration and enforcement and shall
avoid duplication, to the maximum extent practicable, with the
appropriate provisions of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 et
seq.], the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C.A. § 1251
et seq.], the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [7
U.S.C.A. § 136 et seq.], the Safe Drinking Water Act [42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300f et seq.], the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972 [33 U.S.C.A. § 1401 et seq.], and such other Acts of
Congress as grant regulatory authority to the Administrator.
Such integration shall be effected only to the extent that it can be
done in a manner consistent with the goals and policies expressed
in this chapter and in the other acts referred to in this subsection.
42 U.S.C. § 6928. Federal enforcement.
(d) Criminal penalties.
Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any haz-
ardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter to a facil-
ity which does not have a permit under this subchapter, or
pursuant to title I of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanc-
tuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052) [33 U.S.C.A. § 1411 et seq.],
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous
waste identified or listed under this subchapter-
(A) without a permit under this subchapter or pursuant to ti-
tle I of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86
Stat. 1052) [33 U.S.C.A. § 1411 et seq.]; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or require-
ment of such permit; or
(C) in knowing violation of any material condition or require-
ment of any applicable interim status regulations or standards;
(3) knowingly omits material information or makes any false
material statement or representation in any application, label,
manifest, record, report, permit, or other document filed, main-
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tained, or used for purposes of compliance with regulations
promulgated by the Administrator (or by a State in the case of an
authorized State program) under this subchapter;
(4) knowingly generates, stores, treats, transports, disposes
of, exports, or otherwise handles any hazardous waste or any used
oil not identified or listed as a hazardous waste under this sub-
chapter (whether such activity took place before or takes place af-
ter November 8, 1984) and who knowingly destroys, alters,
conceals, or fails to file any record, application, manifest, report,
or other document required to be maintained or filed for purposes
of compliance with regulations promulgated by the Administrator
(or by a State in the case of an authorized State program) under
this subchapter;
(5) knowingly transports without a manifest, or causes to be
transported without a manifest, any hazardous waste or any used
oil not identified or listed as a hazardous waste under this sub-
chapter required by regulations promulgated under this sub-
chapter (or by a State in the case of a State program authorized
under this subchapter) to be accompanied by a manifest;
(6) knowingly exports a hazardous waste identified or listed
under this subchapter (A) without the consent of the receiving
country or, (B) where there exists an international agreement be-
tween the United States and the government of the receiving
country establishing notice, export, and enforcement procedures
for the transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazard-
ous wastes, in a manner which is not in conformance with such
agreement; or
(7) knowingly stores, treats, transports, or causes to be trans-
ported, disposes of, or otherwise handles any used oil not identi-
fied or listed as a hazardous waste under this subchapter-
(A) in knowing violation of any material condition or require-
ment of a permit under this subchapter; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or require-
ment of any applicable regulations or standards under this
chapter;
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than
$50,000 for each day of violation, or imprisonment not to exceed
two years (five years in the case of a violation of paragraph (1) or
(2)), or both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a
first conviction of such person under this paragraph, the maxi-
mum punishment under the respective paragraph shall be
doubled with respect to both fine and imprisonment.
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(g) Civil penalty.
Any person who violates any requirement of this subchapter
shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty in an amount
not to exceed $25,000 for each such violation. Each day of such
violation shall, for purposes of this subsection, constitute a sepa-
rate violation.
42 U.S.C. § 6972. Citizen suits.
(a) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any
person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1)(A) against any person (including (a) the United States,
and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the
extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution)
who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regula-
tion, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has be-
come effective pursuant to this chapter; or
(B) against any person, including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent per-
mitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and in-
cluding any past or present generator, past or present transporter,
or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or
disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the
past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment; or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter
which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall be
brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged
violation occurred or the alleged endangerment may occur. Any
action brought under paragraph (a)(2) of this subsection may be
brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged
violation occurred or in the District Court of the District of Colum-
bia. The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to en-
force the permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement,
prohibition, or order, referred to in paragraph (1)(A), to restrain
any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dispo-
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sal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B),
to order such person to take such other action as may be neces-
sary, or both, or to order the Administrator to perform the act or
duty referred to in paragraph (2), as the case may be, and to apply
any appropriate civil penalties under section 6928(a) and (g) of
this title.
(b) Actions prohibited.
(1) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(A) of
this section-
(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
violation to-
(i) the Administrator;
(ii) the State in which the alleged violation occurs; and
(iii) to any alleged violator of such permit, standard, regula-
tion, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order,
except that such action may be brought immediately after
such notification in the case of an action under this section re-
specting a violation of subchapter III of this chapter; or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is dili-
gently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the
United States or a State to require compliance with such permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or
order.
In any action under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section in a
court of the United States, any person may intervene as a matter
of right.
(2)(A) No action may be commenced under subsection
(a)(1)(B) of this section prior to ninety days after the plaintiff has
given notice of the endangerment to-
(i) the Administrator;
(ii) the State in which the alleged endangerment may occur;
(iii) any person alleged to have contributed or to be contribut-
ing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transpor-
tation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in
subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section,
except that such action may be brought immediately after
such notification in the case of an action under this section re-
specting a violation of subchapter III of this chapter.
(B) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B)
of this section if the Administrator, in order to restrain or abate
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acts or conditions which may have contributed or are contributing
to the activities which may present the alleged endangerment-
(i) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action
under section 6973 of this title or under section 106 of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606.
(ii) is actually engaging in a removal action under section 104
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604.
(iii) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation
and Feasibility Study under section 104 of the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
[42 U.S.C.A. § 9604] and is diligently proceeding with a remedial
action under that Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq. or
(iv) has obtained a court order (including a consent decree) or
issued an administrative order under section 106 of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 980. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606 or section 6973 of this title pursuant to
which a responsible party is diligently conducting a removal ac-
tion, Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RIFS), or pro-
ceeding with a remedial action.
In the case of an administrative order referred to in clause
(iv), actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section are prohib-
ited only as to the scope and duration of the administrative order
referred to in clause (iv).
(C) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B)
of this section if the State, in order to restrain or abate acts or
conditions which may have contributed or are contributing to the
activities which may present the alleged endangerment-
(i) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action
under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section;
(ii) is actually engaging in a removal action under section 104
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604 or
(iii) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation
and Feasibility Study under section 104 of the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9604 and is diligently proceeding with a remedial
action under that Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq.
(D) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B)
of this section by any person (other than a State or local govern-
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ment) with respect to the siting of a hazardous waste treatment,
storage, or a disposal facility, nor to restrain or enjoin the issu-
ance of a permit for such facility.
(E) In any action under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section in
a court of the United States, any person may intervene as a mat-
ter of right when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of
the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest, unless the Administrator or the State
shows that the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
(F) Whenever any action is brought under subsection
(a)(1)(B) of this section in a court of the United States, the plaintiff
shall serve a copy of the complaint on the Attorney General of the
United States and with the Administrator.
(c) Notice.
No action may be commenced under paragraph (a)(2) of this
section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice to the
Administrator that he will commence such action, except that
such action may be brought immediately after such notification in
the case of an action under this section respecting a violation of
subchapter III of this chapter. Notice under this subsection shall
be given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by
regulation. Any action respecting a violation under this chapter
may be brought under this section only in the judicial district in
which such alleged violation occurs.
(d) Intervention.
In any action under this section the Administrator, if not a
party, may intervene as a matter of right.
(e) Costs.
The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought
pursuant to this section or section 6976 of this title, may award
costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert wit-
ness fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party,
whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate. The
court may, if a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunc-
tion is sought, require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(f) Other rights preserved.
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any per-
son (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common
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law to seek enforcement of any standard or requirement relating
to the management of solid waste or hazardous waste, or to seek
any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a
State agency).
(g) Transporters.
A transporter shall not be deemed to have contributed or to be
contributing to the handling, storage, treatment, or disposal, re-
ferred to in subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section taking place after
such solid waste or hazardous waste has left the possession or con-
trol of such transporter, if the transportation of such waste was
under a sole contractual arrangement arising
42 U.S.C. § 7412. Hazardous air pollutants
(a) Definitions.
For purposes of this section, except subsection (r) of this sec-
tion-
(6) Hazardous air pollutant.
The term "hazardous air pollutant" means any air pollutant
listed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.
(8) Electric utility steam generating unit.
The term "electric utility steam generating unit" means any
fossil fuel fired combustion unit of more than 25 megawatts that
serves a generator that produces electricity for sale. A unit that
cogenerates steam and electricity and supplies more than one-
third of its potential electric output capacity and more than 25
megawatts electrical output to any utility power distribution sys-
tem for sale shall be considered an electric utility steam generat-
ing unit.
(b) List of pollutants.
(1) Initial list.
The Congress establishes for purposes of this section a list of
hazardous air pollutants as follows:
CAS number Chemical name
0 Mercury Compounds
NOTE: For all listings above which contain the word "com-
pounds" and for glycol ethers, the following applies: Unless other-
wise specified, these listings are defined as including any unique
chemical substance that contains the named chemical (i.e., anti-
mony, arsenic, etc.) as part of that chemical's infrastructure.
(n) Other provisions.
(1) Electric utility steam generating units.
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(A) The Administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to
public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emis-
sions by electric utility steam generating units of pollutants listed
under subsection (b) of this section after imposition of the require-
ments of this chapter. The Administrator shall report the results
of this study to the Congress within 3 years after November 15,
1990. The Administrator shall develop and describe in the Ad-
ministrator's report to Congress alternative control strategies for
emissions which may warrant regulation under this section. The
Administrator shall regulate electric utility steam generating
units under this section, if the Administrator finds such regula-
tion is appropriate and necessary after considering the results of
the study required by this subparagraph.
(B) The Administrator shall conduct, and transmit to the
Congress not later than 4 years after November 15, 1990, a study
of mercury emissions from electric utility steam generating units,
municipal waste combustion units, and other sources, including
area sources. Such study shall consider the rate and mass of such
emissions, the health and environmental effects of such emissions,
technologies which are available to control such emissions, and
the costs of such technologies.
(C) The National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
shall conduct, and transmit to the Congress not later than 3 years
after November 15, 1990, a study to determine the threshold level
of mercury exposure below which adverse human health effects
are not expected to occur. Such study shall include a threshold for
mercury concentrations in the tissue of fish which may be con-
sumed (including consumption by sensitive populations) without
adverse effects to public health.
42 U.S.C. § 7607. Administrative proceedings and judicial
review.
(b) Judicial review.
(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in
promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air
quality standard, any emission standard or requirement under
section 7412 of this title, any standard of performance or require-
ment under section 7411 of this title, any standard under section
7521 of this title (other than a standard required to be prescribed
under section 7521(b)(1) of this title), any determination under
section 7521(b)(5) of this title, any control or prohibition under
section 7545 of this title, any standard under section 7571 of this
title, any rule issued under section 7413, 7419, or under section
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7420 of this title, or any other nationally applicable regulations
promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under
this chapter may be filed only in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia. A petition for review of the Ad-
ministrator's action in approving or promulgating any
implementation plan under section 7410 of this title or section
7411(d) of this title, any order under section 7411(j) of this title,
under section 7412 of this title, under section 7419 of this title, or
under section 7420 of this title, or his action under section 1857c-
10(c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of this title (as in effect before August 7,
1977) or under regulations thereunder, or revising regulations for
enhanced monitoring and compliance certification programs
under section 7414(a)(3) of this title, or any other final action of
the Administrator under this chapter (including any denial or dis-
approval by the Administrator under subchapter I of this chapter)
which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Not-
withstanding the preceding sentence a petition for review of any
action referred to in such sentence may be filed only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia if such action
is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in
taking such action the Administrator finds and publishes that
such action is based on such a determination. Any petition for re-
view under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days from
the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears
in the Federal Register, except that if such petition is based solely
on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for
review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days after
such grounds arise. The filing of a petition for reconsideration by
the Administrator of any otherwise final rule or action shall not
affect the finality of such rule or action for purposes of judicial
review nor extend the time within which a petition for judicial re-
view of such rule or action under this section may be filed, and
shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule or action.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review
could have been obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject
to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.
Where a final decision by the Administrator defers performance of
any nondiscretionary statutory action to a later time, any person
may challenge the deferral pursuant to paragraph (1).
42 U.S.C. § 7661c. Permit requirements and conditions.
(a) Conditions.
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Each permit issued under this subchapter shall include en-
forceable emission limitations and standards, a schedule of com-
pliance, a requirement that the permittee submit to the
permitting authority, no less often than every 6 months, the re-
sults of any required monitoring, and such other conditions as are
necessary to assure compliance with applicable requirements of
this chapter, including the requirements of the applicable imple-
mentation plan.
(b) Monitoring and analysis.
The Administrator may by rule prescribe procedures and
methods for determining compliance and for monitoring and anal-
ysis of pollutants regulated under this chapter, but continuous
emissions monitoring need not be required if alternative methods
are available that provide sufficiently reliable and timely informa-
tion for determining compliance. Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to affect any continuous emissions monitoring re-
quirement of subchapter IV-A of this chapter, or where required
elsewhere in this chapter.
(c) Inspection, entry, monitoring, certification, and reporting.
Each permit issued under this subchapter shall set forth in-
spection, entry, monitoring, compliance certification, and report-
ing requirements to assure compliance with the permit terms and
conditions. Such monitoring and reporting requirements shall
conform to any applicable regulation under subsection (b) of this
section. Any report required to be submitted by a permit issued to
a corporation under this subchapter shall be signed by a responsi-
ble corporate official, who shall certify its accuracy.
(d) General permits.
The permitting authority may, after notice and opportunity
for public hearing, issue a general permit covering numerous simi-
lar sources. Any general permit shall comply with all require-
ments applicable to permits under this subchapter. No source
covered by a general permit shall thereby be relieved from the ob-
ligation to file an application under section 7661b of this title.
(e) Temporary sources.
The permitting authority may issue a single permit authoriz-
ing emissions from similar operations at multiple temporary loca-
tions. No such permit shall be issued unless it includes conditions
that will assure compliance with all the requirements of this chap-
ter at all authorized locations, including, but not limited to, ambi-
ent standards and compliance with any applicable increment or
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visibility requirements under part C of subchapter I of this chap-
ter. Any such permit shall in addition require the owner or opera-
tor to notify the permitting authority in advance of each change in
location. The permitting authority may require a separate permit
fee for operations at each location.
(f) Permit shield.
Compliance with a permit issued in accordance with this sub-
chapter shall be deemed compliance with section 7661a of this ti-
tle. Except as otherwise provided by the Administrator by rule,
the permit may also provide that compliance with the permit shall
be deemed compliance with other applicable provisions of this
chapter that relate to the permittee if-
(1) the permit includes the applicable requirements of such
provisions, or
(2) the permitting authority in acting on the permit applica-
tion makes a determination relating to the permittee that such
other provisions (which shall be referred to in such determination)
are not applicable and the permit includes the determination or a
concise summary thereof.
Nothing in the preceding sentence shall alter or affect the pro-
visions of section 7603 of this title, including the authority of the
Administrator under that section.
40 C.F.R. § 70.6 Permit content.
(f) Permit shield.
(1) Except as provided in this part, the permitting authority
may expressly include in a part 70 permit a provision stating that
compliance with the conditions of the permit shall be deemed com-
pliance with any applicable requirements as of the date of permit
issuance, provided that:
(i) Such applicable requirements are included and are specifi-
cally identified in the permit; or
(ii) The permitting authority, in acting on the permit applica-
tion or revision, determines in writing that other requirements
specifically identified are not applicable to the source, and the per-
mit includes the determination or a concise summary thereof.
(2) A part 70 permit that does not expressly state that a per-
mit shield exists shall be presumed not to provide such a shield.
(3) Nothing in this paragraph or in any part 70 permit shall
alter or affect the following:
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(i) The provisions of section 303 of the Act (emergency or-
ders), including the authority of the Administrator under that
section;
(ii) The liability of an owner or operator of a source for any
violation of applicable requirements prior to or at the time of per-
mit issuance;
(iii) The applicable requirements of the acid rain program,
consistent with section 408(a) of the Act; or
(iv) The ability of EPA to obtain information from a source
pursuant to section 114 of the Act.
B.S.R.C. 15 § 1963(b)(2).
A petition to review a permit issued under this chapter may
be filed only in the Superior Court of Goodview County within
sixty days after the permit is issued. A permit shall not be subject
to judicial review or challenge in civil or criminal proceedings for
enforcement.
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